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This paper evaluates the past, present, and future progress of the US counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy 
in Iraq. This paper strives to answer the question: did the US COIN strategy in Iraq improve the GoI’s 
legitimacy and reduce the chances of a future Sunni extremist resurgence in Iraq? This paper employs a 
positivist, mixed methods approach to evaluate the effectiveness of one indicator outlined in the US 
Army’s Field Manual 3-24, improving security conditions for the host nation population. This paper 
proposed aggregating quantitative data from two unbiased sources to track civilian casualty rates as the 
conflict progressed. These findings were substantiated by qualitative surveys and interviews of local 
nationals and COIN implementers.  
While quantitative data from 2006-2011 upholds the commonly held belief that the COIN strategy 
improved security conditions in the short-term, the withdrawal of US troops in 2011 and the rapid 
deterioration of the security environment indicates these changes were unsustainable without US support. 
This paper then questioned whether parallel conditions in Iraq today would lead to the emergence of a 
post-Da’ish violent extremist group. This paper first outlined its methods for determining whether the 
emergence of another extremist group is probable. The use of structural analytic techniques in chapter two 
indicates the emergence of another group is likely if sectarian tensions and clashes escalate, and chapter 
three tested this hypothesis by comparing pre and post-Da’ish security conditions in Mosul.  
In chapter three, quantitative data once again indicates a positive change in the security environment after 
the GoI began implementing a population centric approach for defeating Da’ish. However, qualitative 
data from post-Da’ish Mosul indicates that security conditions remained the same or worse for the 
minority Sunni population. This finding juxtaposes security conditions after 2011 with security conditions 
in 2018 and indicates the failure of the GoI to implement a reconciliation strategy may once again lead to 
an extremist uprising.  
iii 
 
Further, this finding underscores the complexity of assessing the COIN campaigns outcome and 
highlights the need for more studies on each of the six indicators identified in FM 3-24. Overall, the US 
must pressure the Government of Iraq to prioritize addressing Sunni grievances to avoid the resurgence of 
violent extremist organizations or the outbreak of another sectarian civil war. 
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The 15-year United States (US) war in Iraq cost Americans $770.5 billion dollars, the lives of 4,542 
servicemen, and altered the course of US relations and interests throughout the region.
1
 Despite US 
efforts and sacrifices, security conditions in Iraq are far from stable.
2
 Over the past 15 years Iraq cycled 
through periods of instability caused by sectarian policies and poor governance. Sectarian policies 
fostered resentment among marginalized communities that contributed to the rise of violent movements 
like al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI). The implementation of a counterinsurgency strategy in 2004 temporarily 
stemmed violence levels.
3
 But the withdrawal of US troops in 2011 and resumption of sectarian 
discriminatory policies allowed violent extremists to once again exploit Sunni grievances and re-emerge 
as a deadly insurgent-terrorist hybrid called Da’ish.
4
 
The defeat of Da’ish marks a crossroads for the future of Iraq.
 5
 To break the cycle of violence 
that plagues the nation, the Government of Iraq (GoI) needs a comprehensive reconciliation plan that 
addresses the grievances that incited sectarian civil war and spawned violent extremist insurgencies in the 
first place. But decision makers seeking to avoid repeating past mistakes need to know, did the US COIN 
strategy meet its objective and improve host nation government legitimacy in Iraq?  The answer to this 
question will shape reconstruction policies in Iraq, alter US involvement levels, and determine future 
                                                 
1 Iraq Body Count. (2003-2018). (England: Conflict Casualties Monitor). Accessed July 14, 2018.  
2 This paper does not assume the US effort in Iraq was a failure, but evaluates what aspects of the US effort succeeded and failed. 
This paper uses FM 3-24 to determine whether the US met its objectives, and defines failure in Iraq as a failure to meet its goals. 
Further, the failure of the US to prevent the emergence of two insurgencies in Iraq indicates an overall failure of the US objective 
to bring peace and stability to Iraq.  
3 It’s important to note that the US military was practicing a limited or “Cold War” form of counterinsurgency. The US military 
decided to update its COIN strategy after four years of escalating conflict in Iraq. Metz, Steven. Learning from Iraq: 
Counterinsurgency in American Strategy (Department of Defense, Strategic Studies Institute, 2007).  
4 According to the CIA’s Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, the key difference between a terrorist and an insurgent group is an 
insurgency’s objective to destroy the existing political order to take control of a physical territory. Ibid. CIA. Guide to the 
Analysis of an Insurgency. pg. 2.  
5 This paper defines Da’ish as a terrorist-insurgent hybrid group. The CIA differentiates an insurgency from a terrorist 
organization by the group’s objective. According to the CIA, “The common denominator of most insurgent groups is their desire 
to control a particular area. This objective differentiates insurgent groups from purely terrorist organizations, whose objectives do 
not include the creation of an alternative government capable of controlling a given area or country.” Da’ish and its predecessor 
AQI vacillate between terrorist and insurgent objectives depending on their operating and organizational capabilities. 
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strategic military priorities. Understanding the outcome of the US COIN campaign also enables 
practitioners to accurately forecast the likelihood of future sectarian or asymmetric conflicts in Iraq.  
This paper examines the efficacy of the US COIN strategy in three parts. Chapter one outlines the 
success objectives listed in the US military’s 2006 Field Manual 3-24 and uses a positivist, mixed 
methods approach to develop a framework for assessing one Measure of Effectiveness (MOE): “The 
ability to provide security for the populace.”
6
 Aggregated quantitative and qualitative data demonstrated 
that the COIN campaign improved this indicator from 2004-2011. However, these changes were 
unsustainable without extensive US involvement. After the US troop withdrawal and discontinuation of 
the COIN strategy in 2011, violence levels spiked, laying the foundation for the emergence of another 
extremist group. 
If an increase in violence levels resulted in the emergence of Da’ish, it is logical to question 
whether the emergence of another group is possible in post-Da’ish Iraq. Chapter two forecasts various 
scenarios for post-Da’ish Iraq. Structural analytical techniques are used to identify conflict drivers, 
underlying assumptions, and potential biases. The prevailing scenario built on this analytical foundation is 
an escalation in sectarian tensions. Power contentions to replace Da’ish will escalate tensions between the 
Shi’a dominated government, Iranian sponsored Shi’a militias, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds. If left unchecked, 
power contentions and continual marginalization of minority groups will allow Da’ish elements to re-
emerge.  
Chapter three tests the likelihood of a Sunni resurgence using the MOE developed in chapter one. 
Chapter three combines quantitative and qualitative data to compare security conditions in Mosul in 2014 
and 2018. The comparison of COIN security conditions from 2006-2011 and pre and post-Da’ish Mosul 
from 2014-2018 is applicable because the US “handed over” COIN responsibilities to the GoI. As 
General David Petraeus stated in an interview in 2013, “…the coalition turned over responsibility for 
                                                 
6 United States Department of the Army. Counterinsurgency. Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24). MWCP 333.5. (Department of the 
Army, 2006).  
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security tasks to Iraqi forces until, at the end of 2011, Iraqi elements assumed all security tasks on their 
own…”
7
 The GoI was supposed to implement reconciliation strategies mirroring COIN doctrine after the 
US began withdrawing troops in 2011. Instead, Petraeus laments, “…various actions by the Iraqi 
government have undermined the reconciliation initiatives of the surge that enabled the sense of Sunni 
Arab inclusion and contributed to the success of the venture.”
8
  
This paper evaluates security conditions in Iraq by assuming elements of the COIN strategy were 
continued, or supposed to be continued, after 2011. This paper questions whether the GoI will reverse its 
habit of abandoning reconciliation/COIN efforts in post Da’ish Mosul. If the GoI actually implements the 
reconciliation strategies recommended by the US Government, it may create a sustainable positive change 
in the post-Da’ish security environment and prevent the resurgence of another violent extremist 
movement. 
Chapter three evaluated the GoI’s performance so far with a granular case study of Mosul. 
Aggregated civilian casualty rates, NGO reported security incidents, and terrorist events decreased since 
2014, indicating that security conditions improved in the short-term. However, an analysis of qualitative 
Sunni interviews demonstrates that Sunnis do not feel safer. Instead, Sunnis in Mosul reported feeling 
ostracized, discriminated against, and often threatened or abused by Shi’a and Kurdish militias. Mixed 
results suggest that counterinsurgency strategies are successful in achieving short-term stability, but 
require more political, financial, and military support to bring long-term changes in the security 
environment for the Sunni population. 
This paper utilizes a realist lens to contextualize and interpret the potential motives of state actors 
in the Middle East. The Middle East is what Robert Gilpin would classify as a “multi-polar” theater where 
the absence of one hegemonic power causes states to constantly fear for their own security.
9
 Pacifying 
                                                 
7
 Petraeus, David. “How We Won in Iraq.” (Foreign Policy. October 29, 2013). 
8 Ibid. Petraeus, David. “How We Won in Iraq.” (Foreign Policy. October 29, 2013).  
9 According to the hegemonic peace theory assumes the world is more stable when a hegemon or great power controls the 
international system. Gilpin, Robert. “Hegemonic War and International Change.” Conflict After the Cold War: Arguments On 
Causes of War and Peace. Edited by Richard K. Betts. 4th Ed. (Pearson, 2002). pg. 107-119.  
4 
 
influences such as economic interdependence, international institutions, and ideology mean little in a 
region dominated by religious, ethnic, and sectarian conflict. The author also acknowledges the 
limitations of a paper written in hindsight on a politically charged topic. The data collected for this paper 
is biased by what data is made available by the US Government and risks falling into the political 
narrative cultivated by the US Government. The author controls for this selection-bias by using data from 
non-government sources and by pulling narrative information from non-US publications. Finally, this 
paper will refer to groups such as al-Qa’ida and Da’ish by the closest transliteration of their Arabic 
name.
10
  This paper adheres to a movement by policymakers, practitioners, and scholars to de-legitimize 




                                                 
10 The National Counter Terrorism Center uses al-Qa’ida to refer to the group because it is the closest transliteration of the 
organization’s Arabic name. Counter Terrorism Center. “Counterterrorism Guide: Al-Qa’ida. (Directorate of National 
Intelligence, 2018). Accessed July 18, 2018. 
11 Irshaid, Faisal. “ISIS, ISIL, IS or Daesh? One group, many names.” (BBC, December 2, 2015). 
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Chapter One: Developing a Measurement of Effectiveness for 
Improving Perceived Host Nation Legitimacy in Iraq 
 
Abstract 
The efficacy of the United States (US) counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq remains a controversial issue 
today. The adoption of Field Manual (FM 3-24) by the US in 2004 signaled a doctrinal shift towards a 
population-centric counterinsurgency strategy. FM 3-24 fails to articulate how the strategy’s success 
would be measured. Particularly, the manual lists improving the perceived legitimacy of the host nation 
government (HNG) as a fundamental objective of the campaign but fails to mention how the six 
indicators of political legitimacy would be measured. This paper fills this research gap by developing a 
Measure of Effectiveness (MOE) for the first indicator listed in FM 3-24: securing the host nation 
population by reducing civilian casualty rates. This paper proposes the creation of an overarching 
framework that can be used to quantitatively track and analyze the influence of a COIN campaign’s 
efforts on the perceived legitimacy of the HNG. Aggregated civilian casualty rates from 2006-2011 and a 
qualitative testimony indicate that the US COIN strategy met its goal of improving host nation legitimacy 
by reducing civilian deaths in the short-term.  
Introduction 
The emergence of an entrenched insurgency in Iraq after US forces withdrew in 2011 casts doubt 
on the ability of the US to wage an effective counterinsurgency campaign and act as a stabilizing force in 
the Middle East. The reverberating effects of the chaos that engulfed Iraq and neighboring states 
including Syria, Libya, Yemen and Afghanistan poses a significant security threat to the US, the stability 
of the Middle East, and to the credibility of US foreign policy decisions and actions abroad. The 
implications of this foreign policy and strategic failure are significant, but the question remains, was the 
US counterinsurgency campaign in Iraq a failure?  
This paper contributes to the ongoing evaluation on the success of the US COIN strategy in Iraq 
by analyzing one key indicator in the US battle to win the “hearts and minds” of the Host Nation 
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Population (HNP) in Iraq. According to the US military’s FM 3-24 adopted in 2004 and revised in 2006, 
the US proposed building a stable society in Iraq by improving the perceived legitimacy of the HNG.
12
 
However, the architects of the plan failed to mention when this job would be completed and how its 
success would be measured. Overall, there is a notable lack of literature developing a framework of 
MOEs that may be used to evaluate changes in host nation legitimacy throughout a COIN campaign. This 
paper fills this gap by assessing one indicator of political legitimacy put forth by FM 3-24.  
While six indicators are put forth by FM 3-24, the limited scope of this paper will only allow the 
analysis of FM 3-24’s first indicator, providing security for the HNP. Additional research on effective 
MOEs must be done to fully assess whether positive changes in population security, just leadership, 
political participation, reductions in corruption, and economic development will facilitate regime 
acceptance from 2006-2011. 
Historic Overview of the War in Iraq, 2003-2011 
After the invasion of Afghanistan in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, the 
Bush administration wanted to extend the “War on Terror” by overthrowing President Saddam Hussein of 
Iraq. In March 2003, the US achieved this objective within the year by launching Operation Iraqi 
Freedom. Despite this short-lived success and President Bush’s now infamous “mission accomplished” 
statement, US efforts to stabilize the country were soon bogged down by ill-conceived decisions and 
policies.
13
 For instance, Lt. Paul Bremmer and the Constitutional Provincial Authority’s decision to 
disband the Iraqi police and intelligence forces led to the subsequent uprising of the trained, armed, and 
now marginalized Sunni minority.
14
  
                                                 
12 United States Department of the Army. Counterinsurgency: Field Manual 3-24 (FM 3-24). MWCP 333.5. (Department of the 
Army, 2006). 
13 In a speech to the flight deck of the USS Lincoln, President Bush praised the success of the invasion Iraq and proclaimed 
“mission accomplished” when referring to the combat operation. These words later haunted the sitting president as the Sunni 
insurgency ignited. CNN. “Bush makes historic speech aboard warship.” Speech by President George W. Bush aboard the USS 
Lincoln. Accessed 2017. (CNN, 2003).  
14 Bremer, Paul. “Iraq Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number One, De-Ba’athification of Iraqi Society.” (Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2003).  
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Starting in 2003 violent extremists used the Sahwa Salafism narrative to convince marginalized 
Sunnis that Islamic world is under attack by outside forces, and calls Muslims to arms to defend the 
ummah or Islamic community.
15
 These issues were magnified by Iraq’s severe sectarian divisions 
between the Sunni minority, the Shi’a majority, and the Kurdish separatists in northern Iraq.
16
 The 
cauldron of unstable actors reached a boiling point in late 2003 when Sunni extremists launched a violent 
campaign of organized attacks and suicide bombings against Coalition forces and the fledgling Shi’a GoI.  
 As violent attacks intensified throughout 2003 into 2004, President Bush’s administration began 
to look for a new leader and strategy to confront the growing al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) insurgency. General 
Petraeus, a long-time COIN activist, was appointed to replace General Casey as Commander of US forces 
in Iraq.
17
 With the help of COIN notables including John Nagl, Eliot Cohen, and Kalev Sepp, the US 
military put together the first Field Manual Interim 3-24 in 2004, which was later followed by FM 3-24 in 
2006.
18
 These documents were written to fill the doctrinal gap present in the US military campaign to 
reclaim Iraq.  
The adoption of a COIN strategy did little to curb the violence at first as US troop casualties 
reach an all-time high by 2007. But the surge in troops managed to drive AQI out of Baghdad into Diyala, 
Salhideen, and Mosul.
19
 By 2008 troop and civilian casualty rates began to decline as over 2,400 AQI 
members were killed and 8,800 captured.
20
 Reductions in violence levels and the decline of AQI’s 
operational capabilities brought a brief period of stability to Iraq.  
Nevertheless, reductions in US troop casualties and a positive turn in the war could not counter 
the American public’s growing discontent with the war. US domestic support for the war plummeted in 
                                                 
15 Brachman, Jarret. “Ideologues.” Global Jihadism: Theory & Practice. (Routledge, 2009). pp. 55. 
16 Pirnie, Bruce and O’Connell, Edward. “Counterinsurgency in Iraq.” (RAND Corporation, 2008).  
17 Gordon, Michael and Shanker, Thom. “Bush to Name a New General to Oversee Iraq. (The New York Times, 2007).  
18 Kaplan, Fred. The Insurgents. (Simon & Schuster, 2013). Print. pg. 147. 
19 Glenn, Cameron. “Timeline: the Rise, Spread, and Fall of the Islamic State.” (Wilson Center, July 5, 2016).  
20 Ibid. Glenn, Cameron. (2013). `’Timeline.” Wilson Center.  
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tandem with President George W. Bush’s approval ratings.
21
 President Barack Obama was subsequently 
elected on his promise to extricate US troops from Iraq and promptly ordered the withdrawal of all US 
troops from the country by 2011.
22
  
The resurgence of AQI after the 2011 troop withdrawal and the rise of Da’ish in 2014 calls into 
question the effectiveness of the heralded US COIN strategy in Iraq. The next section will provide a 
detailed overview of that strategy and its tactics before moving on to an analysis of an effective MOE that 
should be used to help understand the complex outcomes of the Iraq War.  
Literature Review 
This literature review will be broken down into three sections. Section a. consists of a broad 
overview of international relations and parallel literatures within the security studies field. Section b. 
describes the contemporary COIN debate between the maverick and conservative camp. Finally, Section 
c. outlines the methodological literature advanced by scholars interested in tracking the success rate of 
contemporary COIN conflicts.  
a. Broad Overview 
The study of COIN falls within international relations, an umbrella term for the study of the 
interaction of the past and present behavior of nation states based on threats, doctrines, policies, or trends. 
This field can be broken down into two competing explanations for interstate relations. The first approach 
employs a Hobbesian view of human nature and state motives.
23
 According to classical realists such as 
Hans Morgenthau, the international system is inherently anarchic. All states struggle to ensure their 
survival by increasing their power and security.
24
 Neo-realists such as Kenneth Waltz believe power and 
                                                 
21 According to the Pew Research Center, there was a 50% to 38% reduction in American’s that believed the U.S. would succeed 
in Iraq from 2006 to 2011. President Bush’s approval ratings dropped from 86% at the outset of the war to less than 25% by 
2008. Drake, Bruce. “More Americans say US failed to achieve its goals in Iraq.” (Pew Research Center, 2014). 
See also Pew Research Center. “Bush and Public Opinion.” (Pew Research Center, 2008). 
22 Montoooli, Brian. “Obama announces end of Iraq war, troops to return home by year end.” (CBS News, October 1, 2011).  
23Thomas Hobbes is an English philosopher that believed human nature is defined as a struggle to survive. Hobbes, Thomas, Karl 
Schuhmann, and G. A. J Rogers. Leviathan : a Critical Edition. Bristol: Thoemmes Continuum, 2003. 
24 Morgenthau, Hans J. 1965. Politics Among Nations: the Struggle for Power and Peace. 3d ed. Knopf. Print. 
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security are zero sum gains, meaning the more power one state has, the less its rival has.
25
 Robert Gilpin 
adds to this theory by articulating international politics as a balancing act where peace is only possible 




In contrast, notable liberal theorists such as Immanuel Kant, assert that realpolitik or power 
politics can be overcome by building an international system with institutions that encourage 
cooperation.
27
  Michael Doyle’s “democratic peace theory” is one such example.
28
 Finally, other theorists 
such as Joseph Nye and David Welch argue that economic interdependence, rather than a nation’s 
ideology, is the greatest geopolitical pacifier.
29
 As previously mentioned in the introduction section, 
realism was chosen over liberalism as an orienting lens because power politics and balancing theory hold 
more explanatory power in a multi-polar theater. 
The subject of international relations can be broken down into various fields including but not 
limited to security studies, global political economy, or foreign policy. These arguments can likewise be 
applied to other interest areas within the field of international relations or through different levels of 
analysis at the individual, state, or system level.
30
  
Counterinsurgency literature is informed by IR theory and falls within security studies, a sub-field 
of international relations. Other parallel literature includes the applicability of ancient COIN or guerilla 
warfare teachings, the historic study of asymmetric conflict strategies, and the development of 
frameworks for analyzing insurgency types, their motivations, tactics, duration, and final outcome. 
                                                 
25 Ibid. Waltz, Kenneth. “The Origins. 2002. Pg. 100-107.  
26 The hegemonic peace theory assumes the world is more stable when a hegemon or great power controls the international 
system. Gilpin, Robert. “Hegemonic War and International Change.” Conflict After the Cold War : Arguments On Causes of War 
and Peace. 2002. Edited by Richard K. Betts. 4th Ed. (Pearson).pg. 107-119.  
27 Kant, Immanuel. “Perpetual Peace.” Conflict After the Cold War : Arguments On Causes of War and Peace. 2002. Edited by 
Richard K. Betts. 4th Ed. (Pearson). 
28 According to this theory and historical evidence, democracies do not go to war with one another. Russett, Layne, Christopher, 
Spiro, David E., and Michael, Doyle. 1995. “The Democratic Peace.” International Security. Vol. 19, No. 4. (MIT Press). Pp. 
164-184.  
29 Nye, Joseph S. and Welch, David A. 2009. Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation. 8th Ed. (Longman).  
30 Nye, Joseph and Welch, David. Understanding Global Conflict and Cooperation: An Introduction to Theory and History. Ed. 8. 
(Pearson Education, 2009). pp. 33-45. 
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Studies on all of these topics have helped improve our understanding of modern conflict in the post-Cold 
War era, and this paper is an attempt to continue broadening modern warfare literature by studying 
protracted civil-military conflicts. Next, this paper will cover some of the most important historic COIN 
theorists before discussing contemporary authors and schools of thought that discuss whether the doctrine 
is effective and what changes would guarantee a COIN victory in the future. 
Scholars studying COIN literature typically draw on the teachings of T.E. Lawrence’s “Twenty-
seven articles,” on guerilla warfare master Mao Tse-Tung, or on military strategist Sun Tzu to gain a 
better understanding of an insurgent’s strategic thinking.
31
 The COIN student would then turn to French 
colonial authors such as Roger Trinquier and David Galula, who wrote about their extensive experience 
oscillating between hard and soft COIN measures to isolate the insurgent from the host population in the 
Philippines and Malaya. For example, Roger Trinquier in his book Modern Warfare: A View of French 
Counterinsurgency asserts that modern (asymmetric) warfare will become the new norm, and this type of 
warfare can only be combatted using a ruthless “population-centric” approach to isolate and destroy the 
insurgent.
 32
 However, Trinquier’s justification of torture only served to further alienate the Muslim 
population in Algeria and ultimately undermined the French population’s support for the conflict. 
Likewise, David Galula builds on Trinquier’s work by emphasizing the importance of improving 
the political legitimacy of the host nation’s government. In Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and 
Practice, Galula states, “If the insurgent manages to dissociate the population from the counterinsurgent, 
to control it physically, to get its active support, he will win the war because, in the final analysis, the 
exercise of political power depends on the tacit or explicit agreement of the population or, at worse, on its 
                                                 
31 Lawrence, T.E.. “Twenty-seven Articles.” (Simon & Schuster, August 2017) pp. 1-64.  
Tse-Tung, Mao. Mao Tse-Tung on Guerilla Warfare. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith. (Praeger, 1961). Tzu, Sun. The Art of 
War. (Department of Oriental Printed Books and Manuscripts, British Museum, 1910).  
32 The French reliance on the use of torture backfired in Algeria because the exposure of the harsh tactics used during the 
campaign undermined domestic support for the war. See Galula, David. (2006). Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and 
Practice (New York: Praeger, 2006).  





 Galula’s inclusion of the importance of winning the political element of the war was 
extremely influential on the current definitions of counterinsurgency doctrine used by the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) today. 
The British also had their fair share of COIN experience while attempting to quell independence 
movements in Kenya, Malaya, and Ireland. The British were lauded by contemporary scholars such as 
John Nagl for their superior “institutional learning” capability or adaptability when compared to French or 
American’s inability to practice measured restraint.
34
 As Caroline Kennedy-Pipe and Colin McInnes 
assert while studying the British response to the Northern Irish bid for independence, “...the British Army 
did generally exercise restraint in the use of force, recognizing that they were fighting a campaign where 
the political side-effects of the use of force could grossly outweigh any direct military benefits.”
35
  The 
British were able to recognize the insurgent’s attempt to provoke an overreaction that would alienate the 
host population, and responded to this realization by implementing measures that would reduce civilian 
casualties in conjunction with the implementation of civil-military programs.  
Today, proponents and critics of COIN doctrine draw on the teachings of former COIN theorists 
to advocate or disparage a population-centric approach. Although contemporary theorists do not 
necessarily label themselves according to the academic constructs of realists or liberalists, the field can be 
divided into two schools of thought that loosely resemble the liberal and realist mindsets. For instance, 
while the maverick camp provides a more idealistic take on the applicability of a COIN strategy in 
modern conflicts, the conservatives view the “hearts and minds” strategy as a complete failure. This paper 
will now assess the idyllic COIN perspective versus a more pragmatic, pessimistic mindset that divides 
COIN discussions along the typically liberal and realist paradigms.  
                                                 
33 Ibid. Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare. pg. 4. 
34 Nagl, John. “Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: British and American Army Counterinsurgency Learning During the Malayan 
Emergency and the Vietnam War.” World Affairs. Vol. 161, No. 4. (Sage Publications, 1999). pp. 193-199. 
35 Kennedy-Pipe, Caroline, and McInnes, Colin. “British army in Northern Ireland 1969-1972: From policing to counter-terror.” 
Journal of Strategic Studies. 20:2. (Taylor & Francis, 1997). Pp. 1-24. 
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b. Contemporary COIN Theory 
The advocacy and implementation of a modern counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy in Iraq by General 
Petraeus from 2004 to 2006 and in Afghanistan by General Stanley McChrystal in 2008 sparked a debate 
over the efficacy and measurement of “modern nation building” campaigns in both countries. General 
Petraeus and other military officers used the findings developed by Trinquier and Galula to develop the 
COIN doctrine outlined in FM 3-24. FM 3-24 outlines the main objectives of a COIN campaign, assumes 
that improving legitimacy is the main objective of the campaign, and lists six possible indicators of 
legitimacy to be used in Iraq and later Afghanistan.
 36
  
Scholars, policymakers, and military members studying the COIN objectives listed in FM 3-24 
are typically split into two camps: one school of thought advances the “maverick theory” or are 
supportive of General Petraeus’ advocacy of COIN strategy in recent US interventions while the 
“conservative” camp point out flaws in the theory’s implementation, logical framework, and success rate. 
According to the maverick theory advanced and defended by authors including Brian Burton and John 
Nagl, bold thinkers and leaders like General Petraeus turned the tide of the war in Iraq by advocating for a 
change to a COIN strategy.
37
 Maverick or hero generals recognized that AQI’s insurgent strategy could 
only be countered through a holistic population-centric approach that incorporated economic, political, 
social, and institutional programs to strengthen the legitimacy and longevity of the host government. This 
revolutionary doctrine hailed at the outset of the War in Iraq came under fire and intense scrutiny as the 
conflict dragged on for 15 years. Overall, the COIN strategy in Iraq was criticized for its applicability, 
success rate, and feasibility based on our own cultural constraints and wary public approval for the 
continuation of a long, expensive war.  
Conservative authors such as General Gian Gentile disagree with the assumption that a COIN 
campaign was necessary or effective in Iraq. The conservative theory asserts that counterinsurgency 
                                                 
36 Ibid. United States Department of the Army. Counterinsurgency. FM 3-24. 
37 Burton, Brian and Nagl, John. September 18, 2008. “Learning as we go: the US army adapts to counterinsurgency in Iraq, July 
2004-December 2006.” Small Wars and Insurgencies. (Taylor & Francis Online, September 18, 2008). pp. 303-327. pp. 303-327.  
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policies were already being implemented in Iraq, that they do not work, or that a COIN strategy is not 
feasible in the current political climate.
38
 The rise of AQI and Da’ish demonstrate that the application of a COIN 
strategy is not possible under today’s political, funding, and motivational limitations. For example, mounting 
casualty rates, ongoing political and sectarian strife, and the emergence of Da’ish in 2014 indicate that the 
COIN campaign was not enough to restore government legitimacy, and may not be a workable strategy 
under modern day budgetary and popular support constraints.  
Nevertheless, many critics of both wars cannot connect the war’s outcome with a COIN strategy, 
since the strategy was implemented in the middle of the war in Iraq and was incomplete when President 
Obama chose to withdraw US troops in 2011. While this paper does not formally fall within a paradigm 
framework and will not address the argument between the maverick and conservative theorists per se, 
developing a useful framework for measuring host nation legitimacy could be used to support these 
arguments if a notable positive or negative trend is detected post 2004-2006 in Iraq. Understanding the 
outcome of the COIN campaign is also of upmost importance for policymakers guiding future Iraq policy.  
Finally, other contemporary authors conducted studies to address the shortcomings of COIN 
strategies. Author Riley Moore conducted comparative studies of insurgencies in Malaya, the Philippines, 
and Algeria to determine whether a minimum force ratio of troops to insurgents guarantees a COIN 
victory. 
39
 Similarly, authors such as Lorenzo Zambernardi assessed prior insurgencies to find that they all 
succumb to “the impossible trilemma” since the counterinsurgent must sacrifice either the protection of 
his own troops, a lower civilian casualty rate, or the ability to completely wipe out the insurgency to meet 
the other two objectives.
40
 Overall, many authors studied and argued over why COIN theory does not 
work, but fewer attempted to quantitatively track or show the success rate of this controversial doctrine.  
                                                 
38 Gentile, Gian. “A Requiem for Counterinsurgency,” Vol. 57:4. (Orbis) pp. 549-558.  
39 Ibid. Tse-Tung, Mao. On Guerilla Warfare. MFRP-12-18. (US Marine Corps, 1961). Moore, Riley. “Counterinsurgency force 
ratio: strategic utility or nominal necessity.” (Small Wars & Insurgencies, 2013). 24:5, pp. 857-878. 
40 Zambernardi, Lorenzo. “Counterinsurgency’s Impossible Trilemma.” (Washington Quarterly, 2010). 33:3. Pp. 21-34.  
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c. Evaluation & Measurement  
At the outset of the doctrinal shift to a population-centric COIN strategy in Iraq in 2006, the US 
military understood that the campaign would only be successful if the US could improve the legitimacy of 
the Iraqi government in the eyes of the people. Despite this clear objective, scholars such as James Clancy 
and Chuck Crossett point out the lack of a framework or measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to analyze the 
raw data being gathered and reported by the US government.
41
 For example, the DOD submitted a series 
of quarterly reports to Congress entitled “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq.”
42
 These reports assess 
political, economic, and security stability in Iraq by providing a qualitative analysis of political and 
economic indicators such as election participation, the local government’s performance, and the success 
rate of certain laws, anti-corruption efforts, and budget use. However, these measures are largely 
qualitative and are not synthesized or compared to assess relative success or failure in the campaign from 
year to year.  
Other scholars such as Lisa Karlborg moved away from assessing these reports to analyze 
changes in the US military’s strategy throughout the War in Iraq. By comparing the 2006 and 2014 
versions of the Army’s Field Manual 3-24, Karlborg found that the altered definition of legitimacy 
between the two field manuals indicated a shift in the perception of the “host-citizen contract” and 
recognized that improving host-nation legitimacy was an unobtainable or unrealistic objective. As authors 
Bruce Pirnie and Edward O’Connell point out, “Progress in COIN is difficult to assess, because many 
factors are involved, and data are often incomplete or missing.”
43
 Nevertheless, measurable indicators 
must be put forth and tested to determine whether a COIN strategy can destroy an insurgency by 
improving host nation legitimacy. 
                                                 
41 Clancy, James and Crossett, Chuck. “Measuring Effectiveness in Irregular Warfare.” (Parameters, 2007).  
42 US Department of State. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: August 2006 Report to Congress.” (Department of State, 
2006). US Department of State. “Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq: June 2010 Report to Congress.” (Department of State, 
2010).  




As described in the literature review section, the theoretical foundation of this paper is drawn 
from COIN theory, a subsection of the broader security or military strategy field. COIN theory and the 
US military’s doctrinal shift signaled by FM 3-24 are used as an orienting lens or framework for this 
analysis. Several research methods, including a quantitative approach and a purely explanatory case 
study, were compared and considered as potential research strategies for this topic. A purely quantitative 
approach was insufficient due to the data’s limited explanatory and interpretive power. What good is a 
data set without context or without additional explanations from soldiers and commanders on the ground? 
At the same time, an explanatory case study alone lacked the generalizability necessary to establish an 
effective MOE that can be applied to other COIN campaign case studies.  
This paper will therefore explore the creation of a well-rounded MOE by fusing quantitative data 
with a qualitative analysis of the US military’s attempts to reduce civilian casualties. This mixed methods, 
positivist approach is designed to serve as a template for researchers creating an overarching framework 
to measure and assess the efficacy of a COIN campaign. By utilizing a positivist, mixed methods 
approach, this paper will attempt to cover a broader range of information that is required to understand a 
complex, controversial, and sometimes subjective topic like the War in Iraq.
 44
 The next section details 
why a positivist, explanatory case study was selected over alternative methods. 
a. Alternative Methods  
An aggregation of quantitative research was considered as a strong method for developing an 
effective MOE. A purely quantitative approach utilizes data, specifically numerical information or 
statistics, to analyze and explain the results of a research question.
45
 These positivist studies typically use 
the scientific method to test a hypothesis, giving political science a more systematic and replicable 
                                                 
44 A positivist approach uses the scientific method to test and explain a phenomenon. Other key characteristics include a 
hypothesis and a reliance on quantitative data and research. McNabb, David. Research Methods for Political Science: 
Quantitative and Qualitative Methods. 2nd Ed (ME Sharpe, 2004) pp. 15-29. 
45McNabb, David. (2010). Research Methods for Political Science. (Chapter: Introduction to Quantitative Methods). 2nd Ed. 
(M.E. Sharpe, Inc). pg. 93. 
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approach. However, quantitative studies are dependent on the accuracy and validity of the statistics or 
underlying data chosen. This data could misrepresent the target population or could be subject to other 
forms of selection or interpretation bias.  
The potential skewed nature of the majority of the data on civilian casualties represents a major 
stumbling block for assessing the efficacy of the campaign in Iraq by using quantitative data. Both the US 
DoD and the Iraqi government have an interest in publishing favorable data. For example, researchers 
Andrew Shaver and Jacob Shapiro demonstrated that information reporting on civilian deaths decreases 
as estimated civilian casualties increase.
46
 Further, other authors such as Beth Daponte assert that, 
“Sometimes a lack of professional freedom prevents those who are perhaps most familiar with data on the 
suffering population (e.g., analysts whose livelihoods depend on the government(s) directly involved in 
the conflict) from becoming engaged in the discussion of the conflict’s impact.”
47
 Finally, the recent 
release of the Iraq War Logs in 2010 may add as many as 10,000 civilian deaths to the mounting civilian 
death toll, indicating that US DoD published statistics alone may not tell the whole story.
48
 
To overcome potential selection bias when conducting a quantitative analysis, this paper will use 
data from a reputable non-governmental organization known as the Iraq Body Count and data provided by 
the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). This paper supplements this quantitative 
analysis with a qualitative survey study and an on-the-ground testimony that can be used as an effective 
MOE for political legitimacy. Through a combined quantitative-qualitative narrative, this paper provides 
a more well-rounded explanation of whether the implementation of a COIN strategy from 2006 to 2011 
affected civilian casualty rates. 
                                                 
46 Shaver, Andrew and Shapiro, Jacob. “The Effect of Civilian Casualties on Wartime Informing: Evidence from the Iraq War.” 
(Princeton University, 2016).  
47 Daponte, Beth. “Wartime estimates of Iraqi civilian casualties.” (International Review of the Red Cross, 2007). Vol. 89, No. 
868.  
48 According to Iraq Body Count, the release of the Iraq War Logs during the WikiLeaks release on October 22, 2010 shows that 
the US military’s documents estimated an additional 109,032 civilian deaths between January 2004 and December 2009 that were 
not reported to the public. Iraq Body Count. “Iraq War Logs: What the numbers reveal.” (2010). Accessed April 28, 2017.  
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An explanatory case study was also considered. An explanatory case study allows the researcher 
to glean new information from unique cases. The researcher can also trace the causal mechanisms of 
certain outcomes, and may provide a deep historical explanation that can broaden one’s understanding of 
a general trend or phenomenon.
49
 However, the rich detail provided by a case study can also be limiting, 
as specific circumstances may not be applicable in other cases. Any findings would therefore be limited to 
that specific case study, which prevents the researcher from drawing general conclusions about certain 
phenomenon. Case studies may also fall prey to selection bias, as a researcher could “cherry pick” 
historical cases that prove his or her hypothesis.
50
  
This paper circumvents this problem by limiting the scope of the paper’s objective to developing 
one MOE. This study will use general quantitative information available in every COIN campaign: the 
civilian casualty rate. By using statistical data to track a more general phenomenon, this paper will still 
glean the rich detail that can be provided by an explanatory case study. Therefore, this paper will 
incorporate a mixed methods strategy to strengthen the validity and generalizability of the proposed 
research. 
b. Chosen Research Approach 
Mixed methods research is defined as “an approach to inquiry that combines both qualitative and 
quantitative forms of research. It involves philosophical assumptions, the use of qualitative and 
quantitative approaches, and the mixing or integrating of both approaches in a study.”
51
 In other words, 
this paper will use both quantitative and qualitative data to diversify and enrich our understanding of the 
complex outcomes elicited by a COIN strategy. This approach and proposed framework will be used to 
evaluate civilian casualty rates during the most recent US war in Iraq.  
                                                 
49 Bennett, Andrew. "Case study methods: Design, use, and comparative advantages." Models, numbers, and cases: Methods for 
studying international relations (2004). Pp. 19-55. 
50 Lustick, Ian. “History, Historiography, and Political Science: Multiple Historical Records and the Problem of Selection Bias.” 
(Political Science Review, 1996). Vol. 90, No. 3. Pp. 605-618.  
51 Creswell, John. Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches. 4th Ed. (Sage Publications Inc, 
2013). pg. 245. 
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According to renowned researcher and mixed methods champion John Creswell, mixed methods 
approaches are differentiated by four factors: the study’s timing or sequential order, the weight or 
importance assigned to various data, how and when that data is combined, and by the underlying theory 
used to inform the study.
52
 A study’s timing can be done either sequentially or concurrently, can ascribe 
more value to one type of data than another, and can either integrate, connect, or embed one type of data 
with another. When combined with an explicit or implicit theoretical underpinning, these variations can 
be combined or mixed to reduce inherent biases while providing a broader understanding or explanation 
of a given phenomenon. This paper uses a concurrent embedded design illustrated by figure one, 
Creswell’s Concurrent Designs.  
A concurrent embedded design presents both quantitative and qualitative data simultaneously, or 
concurrently. This design differs from sequential designs because the data is not collected or analyzed in 
various phases. Quantitative and qualitative data will also be weighted differently throughout the analysis, 
                                                 
52 Ibid. Creswell, John. (2009). Research Design. pp. 203-251. 
Figure 1: Concurrent Designs. Found in Creswell (2007), adapted from Creswell et al. (2003) 
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causing the qualitative data to be “embedded” or to play a supporting role to the quantitative data.
53
 These 
two data sets will also be presented using a transformative strategy, in which, “…the researcher identifies 
one of the qualitative theoretical frameworks and uses the framework through the mixed methods study, 
such as to establish the research problem, the questions, the data collection and analysis, interpretation, 
and the call for action.”
54
  
Specifically, this study will use the transformative strategy through the COIN framework and 
metrics outlined in FM 3-24, and will employ an embedded design that prioritizes quantitative findings 
over qualitative discoveries. Figure 2 outlines this concurrent embedded/transformative design using 
COIN theory as the overarching framework. In lieu of the parameters used by Creswell in his previously 
mentioned figure, lower case spelling indicates a smaller emphasis or weight while a box within another 
illustrates that one data subset will be embedded in another. Therefore, figure two shows that quantitative 
data will be supported by qualitative data, and will be analyzed within the existing COIN framework. 
Figure 2: Concurrent Embedded/Transformative Design
55
      
 
The overarching framework used to analyze changes in perceived government legitimacy will be 
the definitions and objectives outlined in FM 3-24 issued in 2006 by the US military. FM 3-24 outlines 
six indicators of legitimacy that can be used to evaluate host nation legitimacy in Iraq. These indicators 
are:  
                                                 
53 Ibid Creswell, John. (2009). Research Design. pg. 214. 
54 Ibid Creswell, John. (2013). Research Design. 4th Ed. pg. .249.  
55 The design for this figure was inspired by Creswell’s Concurrent Designs figure (2009). Creswell, John. Research Design. 
(2009). 3rd Ed. pg. 214. 
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1. The ability to provide security for the populace (including protection from internal and external 
threats). 
2. Selection of leaders at a frequency and in a manner considered just and fair by a substantial majority of 
the populace. 
3. A higher level of popular participation in or support for political processes  
4. A culturally acceptable level of corruption 
5. A culturally acceptable level and rate of political, economic, and social development 
6. A high level of regime acceptance by major social institutions
56
  
Due to the limited scope of this paper, this paper only develops an MOE for the first highlighted 
indicator of political legitimacy, the security of the HNP. The legitimacy of the government rests on its 
ability to provide security and basic necessities for the local population. This paper will improve the 
explanatory power of its proposed MOE by concurrently analyzing qualitative and quantitative data. 
Qualitative narratives provided by a survey of Iraqi civilians and the testimony of a US soldier will help 
strengthen the validity of a quantitative analysis on the incidence of civilian casualties. The combination 
of these two metrics will create a more robust measurement tool that can be used to track changes in HNG 
legitimacy. These MOEs may not only be applied to Iraq, but are generalizable to other case studies such 
as Afghanistan. 
The legitimacy of the government rests on its ability to provide security and basic necessities for 
the local population. This paper posits that indicators such as rates of violence, food security, corruption, 
and opinion polls could be used to track the efficacy of the six indicators of legitimacy listed above. This 
mixed methods approach represents a combination of the three approaches considered, thus creating a 
more robust study that will draw on a variety of data to overcome quantitative data gaps while creating a 
                                                 
56Department of the Army. Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies. FM 3-24/MCW 3-33. (2014). Pg. 1-21. 
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framework and method that can be applied to interpret changes in host nation legitimacy within other US 
COIN campaigns. 
Insurgency & COIN Theory 
An insurgency is broadly defined as a political or social movement that uses subversion and 
violence to undermine the existing political order.
57
 Insurgencies typically gain traction when a ruling 
government fails to address social grievances, exacerbates social unrest through discrimination, 
repression, or excessive force, and when there are no viable political or economic alternatives.
58
 Bereft of 
other options or opportunities, desperate civilians will organize around a rallying cause, seek the support 
of the local population, and will begin a subversive campaign to call attention to the government’s 
inability to secure the population.
59
  
Insurgents rely on guerilla tactics championed by military strategists Sun Tzu or Mao Tse-Tung. 
According to General Mao, “In guerilla warfare, select the tactic of seeming to come from the east and 
attacking from the west…When guerillas engage a stronger enemy, they withdraw when he advances; 
harass him when he stops; strike him when he is weary; pursue him when he withdraws.”
60
 Guerilla 
fighters can survive overwhelming force ratios by staying hidden, striking when least expected, and by 
dragging out the war’s duration until the enemy loses the political will to fight.
61
 Most recently, the US 
encountered this “long war” strategy while fighting the Taliban in Afghanistan and al-Qa’ida in Iraq. The 
failure of the US to quell an insurgency uprising in both countries brought the question of how to confront 
this “hearts and minds” strategy to the forefront of the global stage. 
                                                 
57 Department of Defense. “Counterinsurgency Operations.” Joint Publication 3-24. (2009).  
58 Ibid. Trinquier, Roger. Modern Warfare. (1961). pg. 5-8. 
59 Galula, David. Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. (Praeger, 2006). 
60 General Mao was a Chinese communist leader who taught his men to use guerilla tactics in conjunction with a 
political/propaganda campaign to bolster China’s independence movement against the Japanese. Ibid. Tse-Tung, Mao. Mao Tse-
Tung. (1961). 
61 According to author Riley Moore, case studies on several different counterinsurgency campaigns demonstrates that there is no 
standard force minimum that will guarantee success against an insurgent movement. For example, in Algeria the French deployed 
20 soldiers per 1000 civilians. Despite this overwhelming force ratio, the French were unsuccessful at quelling the Algerian 
insurgency. Ibid. Moore, Riley. “Counterinsurgency force ratio.” (2013). pp. 857-878.  
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Contemporary COIN strategists such as John Nagl and David Kilcullen highlighted the 
importance of winning the political support or “hearts and minds” of the local population by meeting the 
basic demands of the people. Typically, these demands include guaranteeing the population’s safety from 
the insurgency or the government itself while bolstering the country’s infrastructure and economy. In his 
manual, Counterinsurgency, David Kilcullen asserts that, “If we want people to partner with us, put their 
weapons down, and return to unarmed political dialogue rather than work out their issues through 
violence, then we must make them feel safe enough to do so, and we must convince them they have more 
to gain by talking than by fighting.”
62
 By meeting the constituency’s demands for basic necessities such 
as security, jobs, health, roads, and electricity, the counterinsurgent undermines the insurgent cause by 
improving the perceived legitimacy of the HNG.  
Legitimacy therefore becomes a strategic objective for the intervening force. As the CIA 
articulates in the Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency, an effective counterinsurgency strategy 
“...integrates and synchronizes political, security, legal, economic, development, and psychological 
activities to create a holistic approach aimed at weakening the insurgents while bolstering the 
government’s legitimacy in the eyes of the population.”
63
 Further, if the goal of COIN practitioners is to 
increase host-government legitimacy, then legitimacy may indicate positive or negative trends in a COIN 
campaign and provides additional insight into the controversial debate over the US campaign in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
The COIN Strategy in Iraq 
FM 3-24 called for a COIN strategy in line with the teachings of Roger Trinquier and David 
Galula. The US adopted a population-centric “clear-hold-build” strategy. This strategy called for “clear” 
operations conducted by Coalition forces to eliminate insurgents through aerial strikes and targeted 
operations. Mounting clearing operations required a drastic increase in troop levels, resulting in a surge of 
                                                 
62 Kilcullen, David. Counterinsurgency. (Oxford University Press, 2010). pg. 4.  
63 Central Intelligence Agency. 2012. Guide to the Analysis of Insurgency. Government Printing Office: Washington, DC. pg. 1.  
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150,000 troops by 2007.
64
 In addition, the US military implemented the “Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, 
Assess” (F3EA) method to operationalize intelligence networks to locate and dismantle insurgent cells.
65
 
After an area was cleared, the US proposed to “hold” territory by training friendly local police 
and military units to defend the area. According to FM 3-24, “Establishment of HN security forces in 
bases among the population furthers the continued disruption, identification, and elimination of the local 
insurgent leadership and infrastructure. The success or failure of the effort depends, first, on effectively 
and continuously securing the populace.”
66
 To provide constant security for the HNP, the US military 
began deploying small Special Forces Operations to train local police forces to protect their communities 
against AQI insurgent attacks.
67
  
These “hard tactics” were complemented by a civil military approach designed to win the support 
of the local population. The US military allocated over $18.4 billion dollars towards Iraq reconstruction 
projects under Public Law 108-106.
68
 These projects were designed to foster political and economic 
growth by improving key services such as electricity, health clinics, schools, and the erection of other key 
infrastructure programs. Thus, by providing a secure environment and basic services for the HNP, the US 
government hoped to dissuade the Iraqi people from supporting AQI. This paper will now assess the 
efficacy of this strategy by looking at one of the dimensions proposed by the US military. Since securing 
the population was the first objective of the US military at the outset of the COIN strategy, this paper will 
analyze whether civilian casualty rates improved from 2006 to 2011.  
Case Study: Evaluating Civilian Casualties as an MOE  
This paper proposes metrics for FM 3-24’s first indicator to be used in an overarching COIN 
measurement framework. As previously stated, the first indicator in FM 3-24 for measuring changes in 
                                                 
64 Sanger, David E. “Bush Adds Troops in Bid to Secure Iraq.” (The New York Times, January 11, 2007).  
65 Ibid. Kilcullen, David. (2010). Counterinsurgency. pg. 4. 
6666 Ibid. US Department of the Army. FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5. (2006). pp. 5-19.  
67 Bruno, Greg. “The Role of the ‘Sons of Iraq’ in Improving Security.” (Council on Foreign Relations, 2008).  
68 Bowen, Stuart. “Management of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Program: The Evolution of the Iraq Reconstruction 
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political legitimacy is the provision of security f or the HNP. One measure to assess whether US troops 
provided this security is changes in civilian casualty rates. 
Civilian casualty rates from the Iraq Body Count (IBC) and United Nations (UN) databases are 
aggregated and presented in comparison to developments throughout the Iraq War. These data sources 
were selected from a handful of surveys from other organizations for several reasons. The first reason is 
that neither source is overtly affiliated with either the US or Iraq and should present a less biased 
depiction of civilian casualties over time than an organization like the Iraqi Health Ministry. Further, the 
two organizations offer substantive data over time, whereas other prominent studies such as the 2006 
Lancet Survey only offer a snapshot of civilian casualties over a small window of time.
69
 Findings 
presented by the data will then be enhanced by a qualitative narrative presented by a soldier on the ground 
and by a mass survey of Iraqi civilians during the war. These two approaches will be presented 
concurrently and will provide a much broader depiction of a narrow aspect of the Iraq War. 
a. Quantitative Civilian Casualties Analysis 
Figure 3 depicts aggregated civilian deaths on a yearly basis from 2006-2011.
70
 Both 
organizations indicate that November 2006 was the deadliest month of the Iraq campaign for civilians. 




A series of studies conducted by UNAMI reached similar conclusions with an estimated 34,452 
civilians killed in 2006.
72
 Despite variances in the estimates derived by both organizations, the trends 
indicate that violence started to decline in mid-2007 in Iraq.  
 
                                                 
69 Burnham, Gilbert, Lafta, Riyadh, Doocy, Shannon, and Roberts, Les. “Mortality after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: a cross-
sectional cluster sample survey.” (The Lancet, 2006).  
70 A detailed description of the methodology used to standardize and validate these results can be found on the websites 
“Methods” section. Ibid. IBC. “Documented civilian deaths.” 
71 Ibid IBC. “Documented civilian deaths.” (IBC, 2017). 





These trends clash with the next available data after the US withdrawal in 2011 depicted by 
Figure 4. After 2011, civilian casualty rates began to climb once again. The GoI struggled to resume US 
COIN strategies and failed to secure Sunni extremist territories, giving violent extremists the opportunity 
to exploit the subsequent security vacuum. Violent extremists returned from Syria and escaped from 
prisons, and began to form the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham, or Da’ish. The emergence of the group 
coincides with a rapid deterioration in the security environment after 2011 (illustrated below) and 


















Figure 4: Civilian Casualty Data 2011-201473 
Overall, civilian casualties began to plateau around 2007, and steadily began to drop from 2008 to 
2011 when they reached their lowest rate since the beginning of the war in 2003 at only 4,162 
casualties.
74
 This 85.87% reduction in civilian casualties indicates that security for the host population 
improved significantly from the implementation of a COIN strategy in 2006 and the surge of US forces in 
2007 until the policy shift in 2011. From the quantitative data provided by the IBC and the UN, this paper 
found that civilian casualties did not drop immediately after the implementation of the US COIN strategy. 
After a significant time lag of about a year, civilian casualties declined and the security situation, 
according to this one MOE, became stable.  
However, Figure 4 demonstrates a departure point from the positive trends elicited by the 
implementation of the COIN strategy. After 2011, IBC and UNAMI rates doubled from 4,162 in 2011 to 
9,852 in 2013. This rapid deterioration in the security environment indicates a complete failure in the 
GoI’s ability to continue securing the HNP. As a result, it is unsurprising the local Sunni population 
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accepted and supported the rise of Da’ish a year later. This paper will now assess these conclusions from 
a qualitative perspective by analyzing he survey results of over 2,000 Iraqi citizens affected by the 
conflict and a first-hand account of a COIN implementer. 
a. Qualitative Civilian Casualties Analysis 
The Opinion Research Business (ORB) conducted a census of 2,414 adults across 15 of 18 of 
Iraq’s provinces to assess civilian casualties at the height of the Iraq War. The British organization used 
an Iraqi polling firm known as IIACSS to conduct a random cluster sample throughout Iraqi 
neighborhoods.
75
 According to the study’s findings, approximately 20% of the participants answered 
“YES” when asked if a member of their household was killed during the conflict, which resulted in a 
staggering 946,258 to 1.12 million people killed from 2003 to 2007.
76
 This estimate is significantly higher 
than the estimates found by the IBC and UNAMI. However, by January 2008 the ORB expanded its area 
of research to include participants in rural areas and dropped its casualty rates by 200,000. This change 
was perceived by some scholars such as Michael Spagat and Josh Dougherty in “Conflict Deaths in Iraq: 
A Methodological Critique of the ORB Estimate” as a negative indication on the study’s methodological 
approach. However, other research giants like the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health 
praised the study. 
77
 In sum, my inclusion of the statistics derived from the ORB survey validated the 
quantitative data trends that 2006 to 2008 were the deadliest years for civilians in the Iraq War. Beyond 
this assertion, this qualitative data set was determined to be too deviant to conclude that the 
implementation of a COIN strategy significantly impacted the civilian casualty rate. 
Moving from a qualitative survey approach, this paper assessed the testimony of Lieutenant 
Colonel Dale Kuehl during his time implementing US COIN doctrine with the First Battalion, 5th 
                                                 
75 Spagat, Michael and Dougherty, Josh. “Conflict Deaths in Iraq: A Methodological Critique of the ORB Estimate.”  (Survey 
Research Methods, 2010). Vol. 4, No. 1. pp. 3-15.  
76 According to Reuters, the director of the group stated that the survey was conducted to provide an accurate record of Iraqi 
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Cavalry Regiment of the US Army.
78
 Lt. Col. Kuehl deployed to Iraq in October 2006. He and his unit 
were sent to Ameriyah, Iraq with the mission to secure the local population. Kuehl noted, “During our 
time in Baghdad, al-Qaeda insurgents were pushed out of Haifa Street, many relocating to 
Ameriyah…after each operation, Al-Qaeda insurgents returned because we still had not fully gained the 
trust of the population. The insurgents would either leave or blend into the population until the 
concentration of troops moved to another location. Gains were superficial and temporary. Al-Qaeda’s 
local political and military organizations within the area remained intact.”
79
 Kuehl asserts that his men 
knew what objective they were trying to attain and outlines the difficulties his unit had in executing their 
COIN inspired mission. According to Kuehl, his unit was initially stymied by a lack of local human 
intelligence and population support.  
However, over time Kuehl’s unit purposefully adopted a policy of measured restraint when 
responding to violent incidents. Kuehl asserted, “I continued to emphasize the need for restraint, focused 
operations, and treating the locals with dignity and respect. Restraint was not popular, but the battalion’s 
leaders controlled their Soldiers, and they maintained their discipline. Months later, as we prepared to 
redeploy, the leading imam and most influential citizen in Ameriyah said that our restraint was key to our 
gaining the trust of the people.”
80
 This tactic proved effective at gaining the HNP’s trust, as Kuehl later 
testifies “We saw dramatic improvements in security when we changed our focus to establishing 
conditions to secure the population rather than transitioning responsibility to the Iraqi Security Forces 
(ISF).”
81
 In conclusion, Kuehl’s testimony shines a positive light at the granular level of the efficacy of a 
COIN strategy on reducing civilian casualties in a targeted area of operation. 
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Conclusions & Future Contributions 
 This paper proposed a transformative, concurrent, mixed methods approach as an MOE that 
could be used to measure the impact of indicator one from FM 3-24. By integrating civilian casualty data 
from two different databases, this paper posited that civilian casualty rates could be used to assess the 
efficacy of the Iraq COIN strategy implemented from 2006 to 2011. While the quantitative data pulled 
from the IBC and the UN showed that the US military achieved its objective of limiting civilian casualties 
after 2007, the survey conducted by the ORB was less conclusive. However, the testimony of one soldier 
charged with COIN implementation of a COIN strategy helped his unit reduce civilian casualties and earn 
the trust of the local population in Ameriyah, Iraq. Overall, researchers striving to create detailed, 
balanced MOEs should consider adopting a mixed methods approach to integrate both quantitative and 
qualitative data into their narrative. 
This mixed methods study could also be strengthened by incorporating additional well-vetted 
quantitative and qualitative statistics. Additional research should be conducted to derive other MOEs such 
as government corruption and HNG standing on the global corruption scale, election participation, the 
implementation of social service projects, increases in HNG funding, and military capability. All of these 
are measurable statistics that could be used to track the efficacy of the six indicators of legitimacy listed 
in FM 3-24. Moreover, additional case studies of different time frames in Iraq or of the COIN campaign 
in Afghanistan may also help strengthen the validity of the framework presented in this paper. The 
military lacks a credible overarching framework that can be used to assess the efficacy of the Iraq War. 
By developing more MOEs that can be used to track military objectives such as securing the population, 
the US will get one step closer to developing and implementing a clear COIN strategy.  
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Chapter Two: War, Stability, or Somewhere In-between: Forecasting the 
Future of Iraq 
 
Introduction 
The painstaking campaign to retake the last Da’ish stronghold in Iraq is at an end.
82
 Now the most 
pressing question is: what are the likely outcomes for post-Da’ish Iraq? This paper considers likely 
scenarios and alternative outcomes for the future of Iraq. This paper assesses the likelihood of each 
scenario by examining historic precedents, highlighting internal sectarian and religious group motives, 
and by weighing the desired outcomes of influential external powers such as Iran, Turkey, and the US. 
Iraq is a complex theater with many actors vying for control, and the complexity of Iraq’s longstanding 
instability will only increase now that Da’ish is defeated.  
This paper concludes Da’ish’s defeat will not bring peace to Iraq. Instead, unresolved balance of 
power issues between sectarian factions, the inability of the GoI to dismantle unruly militias and 
entrenched corruption, and the gradual withdrawal of US support will aggravate pre-existing divides. 
These divisions will lead to localized clashes among Iraqi government, Shi’a, Sunni, and Kurdish militias 
and will prolong Iraq’s constant state of conflict. The first section briefly describes the conflict in Iraq and 
the Da’ish rise, and the organization’s defeat. This is followed by a summary of the key actors in Iraq, a 
literature review, and an overview of the structural analytic technique that is used to conduct predictive 
analyses. Finally, this paper will present several likely scenarios and alternatives based on the most 
prominent conflict drivers in Iraq today. 
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Overview of the War in Iraq, 2003-2014 
As stated in chapter one, Iraq has been in a constant state of conflict since the US invasion 
toppled President Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003.
83
 The deposition of Saddam Hussein and the 
subsequent marginalization of the Sunni minority gave rise to the al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) insurgency that 
targeted the ruling Shi’a majority and US forces.
84
 The group exploited the resentment and powerlessness 
incurred by Shi’a, Kurdish, and US exclusionary policies to radicalize marginalized Sunnis and motivate 
them to join a Salafi-Jihadist violent cause.
85
  
The US military realized it could no longer rely on conventional tactics to combat this growing 
Sunni insurgency. Over 3,000 Iraqis were being killed a month by 2006 and it was clear that the GoI and 
ISF were unable or unwilling to stop the fighting.
86
 General Petraeus and other military leaders 
acknowledged the need for a multi-faceted strategy to improve security, economic, and development 
prospects for the HNP while eliminating AQI cells throughout Iraq.
87
 The US military adopted a COIN 
strategy in the form of FM 3-24. FM 3-24 called for a population-centric doctrinal shift that would 
minimize civilian casualties, undermine the insurgent narrative, and ultimately improve HNG 
legitimacy.
88
    
The subsequent “surge” of US troops in 2007 in conjunction with the 2005 “Anbar Awakening” 
or the revolt of Sunnis against Da’ish, and the death of the group’s leader in a 2006 drone strike 
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decimated AQI’s operational capabilities.
89
  By 2008, over 2,400 AQI members were killed and by 2010, 
36 of AQI’s 42 leaders were dead.
90
 These military victories reduced violence levels, restored stability, 
and culminated in the temporary defeat of AQI in Iraq.
91
 
However, the withdrawal of US troops in 2011 and the transition of COIN responsibilities to the 
GoI, ISF, and Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) forces and the GoI’s inability to implement them 
created another opening for extremist leaders to return to Iraq. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki stoked 
sectarian tensions by refusing to let Sunni militias join the GoI’s security forces, cutting militia pay, 
replacing Sunni Arab and Kurdish military officers with incompetent Shi’a, and harassing Sunni 
politicians.
92
 Sunni tensions reached a boiling point in April 2013 when Shi’a security forces open fired 
on protesting Sunni Arabs, killing and wounding dozens of people.
93
 In the same month Abu Bakr al 
Baghdadi merged AQI forces with Jabhad al Nusra to form Da’ish.
94
 The combination of a weak central 
government, the outbreak of another sectarian civil war, and a readily available recruitment base in the 
form of disenfranchised and marginalized Sunnis enabled the rapid rise of Da’ish across Iraq and Syria in 
2014. 
The revitalized AQI group gained global attention by conducting suicide bombings, 
assassinations, and kidnapping and executing foreign nationals.
95
 The group set itself apart from former 
terrorist organizations by deploying a media campaign to broadcast their anti-Western occupation 
message, raise awareness of their campaign achievements, and to gain international recruits.
96
 This media 
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campaign was extremely successful and allowed the group to swell from just 1,000 fighters in 2004 to an 
estimated 23,000-30,000 by 2014.
97
  
The group gained worldwide notoriety as Da’ish in January 2014 when the group conquered 
Fallujah and Ramadi in western Iraq and areas in eastern Syria and Libya.
98
 By June 2014, the group that 
President Obama infamously dismissed as the junior varsity team conquered Iraq’s second largest city of 
Mosul, gained over $2 billion in assets, and contributed to the rapid collapse of the Iraqi army.
99
 Da’ish 
appointed Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as its leader and proclaimed it a worldwide caliphate governed by 
Sharia law.
100
 At the height of its power, the group controlled over six million people in a territories 
spanning across Syria and Iraq.
101
 
The group’s strategy differed from AQI’s because its main objective was to hold territory.
102
 Like 
an insurgency, the group understood the core tenants of Mao Tse-Tung, T.E. Lawrence, and Sun Tsu and 
initiated a campaign to undermine HNG legitimacy. ISIS exploited the GoI’s inability to secure its 
citizens by conducting attacks against GoI and Shi’a troops. The group augmented this offensive strategy 
with a political strategy to capture the “hearts and minds” of its newly conquered population by providing 
basic infrastructure services for the Sunni population.  
Da’ish continued to follow AQI’s lead by using social media to spread its message and to broaden 
its recruitment base. Da’ish also continued to publicize its brutal tactics including suicide bombings, 
public executions, and beheadings of abducted international civilians on social media to illicit a strong 
psychological reaction and garner international attention. For example, Da’ish’ campaign to eradicate and 
enslave Iraq’s Yazidi minority in the Sinjar province made international headlines.
103
 The UN 
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Independent International Commission of Inquiry found that Da’ish crimes against the Yazidis 
constituted as genocide, and estimated that at least 5,000 Yazidis were killed since the beginning of the 
campaign.
104
 However, these brutal tactics were counter-productive to Danish’s insurgency strategy and 
contributed to the rise of another Sunni awakening.  
Parallel to the Anbar Awakening, indiscriminate violence against minority groups and Muslims 
prompted a rise in HNP backlash against Da’ish, inducing retribution attacks and alienating potential 
Muslim allies.
105
At the same time, 2014, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani issued a fatwa after the fall of 
Mosul urging Shi’as to defend their communities against Da’ish.
106
 A conglomerate of Shi’a and Sunni 
militias known as the Popular Mobilization Force (PMF) was formed to combat Da’ish.
107
 The rise of 
Da’ish also gave formerly warring sectarian and ethnic groups the impetus to unite. Throughout 2016 and 
2017, a coalition of US, Iraqi Security Forces, Iraqi Popular Mobilization and Units (PMU), Sunni backed 
Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the Kurdish Peshmerga, and the Kurdish People’s Protection Units 
(YPG) successfully deprived Da’ish of its Syrian and Iraqi strongholds by the end of 2017.  
In response to the group’s defeat, many Da’ish experts hypothesize the group will disperse and 
abandon its territorial ambitions in favor of international small cell and lone wolf operations. Others 
believe Da’ish members may be ostracized and killed in retribution attacks and are going to have 
difficulty assimilating back into Iraqi or foreign societies.
108
 In either case, the demise of Da’ish in its 
current form is imminent and authorities must consider how this change will affect Iraq. 
The conflict that began in 2003 resulted in the death of over 158,200 people and the displacement 
of 4,403,300.
109
 The defeat of Da’ish marks a new crossroads in Iraq’s history and many people question 
Iraq’s future prospects now that the Iraqi Government, Shi’as, Sunnis, and Kurds no longer have a 
                                                 
104 United Nations Human Rights Council. June 15, 2016. “’They came to destroy’: ISIS Crimes Against the Yazidis.” United 
Nations.  
105 Ibid. Stanford University. “The Islamic State.”  
106 Watling, Jack. December 22, 2016. “The Shia Militias of Iraq.” (The Atlantic, December 22, 2016).  
107 Ibid. Watling, Jack. “The Shia Militias of Iraq.” (The Atlantic, December 22, 2016).  
108 Simon, Steven. June 16, 2014. “Who Will Win in Iraq?” The New York Times.  
109 Armed Conflict Database. “Iraq.” Accessed September 30, 2017.  
35 
 
common enemy. To ensure a peaceful solution, the Iraqi government will need to implement Security 
Sector Reform (SSR) to dismantle non-government-controlled militias to facilitate the reconciliation 
process and to protect vulnerable populations from retribution attacks.
110
 As of July 2018, three 
troublesome signs continue to diminish prospects for peace in Iraq. First, the Iraq Government’s Prime 
Minister Haider al-Abadi’s control over the PMU militias is tenuous and territorial clashes between 
sectarian militias are highly likely. In addition, reports from Human Rights Watch and Amnesty 
International assert that Shi’a militias continue to carry out human rights abuses against Sunni 
communities.
111
 The abuses include killing and disappearing Sunni residents, destroying their property, 
displacing Sunni families, and making it difficult for them to return to their homes.
112
  
The United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI) also accused ISF forces and associated 
militias of kidnappings, killings, and the destruction of private property of the families of alleged Da’ish 
members.
113
 These actions reduce the probability for reconciliation and increase the likelihood that 
retribution attacks will continue in reclaimed areas. According to the Deputy Middle East Director of 
Human Rights Watch, “…civilians are paying the price for Iraq’s failure to rein in the out-of-control 
militias. Countries that support Iraqi security forces and the Popular Mobilization Forces should insist that 
Baghdad bring an end to this deadly abuse.”
114
 However, the actual ability and desire of the Government 
of Iraq (GoI) to reign in these militias is questionable, especially while the groups continue to receive 
funding and support from external powers like Iran. Further, in November 2016 the Iraqi parliament 
passed a law that recognized the PMU as an official part of the Iraq Security Forces. The law was met by 
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intense criticism by Iraqi Sunnis, who believe the measure will embolden and enable these groups to 
abuse their power and exploit Sunni communities.
115
 
Second, tensions between the GoI and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) remain high 
after the September 25 Kurdish Independence Referendum. After the Independent Kurdish Region voted 
to become an independent state, the GoI retaliated by moving troops into contested areas, forcing the 
Kurdish Peshmerga to pull back. The GOI then took control of Kurdistan’s airports in Erbil and 
Sulaimaniyah.
116
 The airport closure curbed international travel to Kurdistan and took a toll on the 
Kurdish economy. Amid a growing economic and political crisis, the KRG’s President Masoud Barzani 
announced his resignation, raising Kurdish anxiety over a return to Iraqi rule and potential human rights 
abuses parallel to those that occurred under President Saddam Hussein’s rule.
117
  
Third, the continual withdrawal of US support from Iraq may exacerbate internal tensions and 
result in an increase of Iranian influence over the Iraqi government. The current Iraqi government’s pro-
Iranian statements and refusal to disband Iranian-backed militias indicates a potential balance of power 
disruption in favor of Iran.
118
 This development is troubling because an increase in Iran’s influence will 
result in a US enemy holding “…substantive control of a state containing 36 million people…and an oil 
power that intends to build the capacity to export oil on the same scale as Saudi Arabia within a 
decade.”
119
 This so called “Hezbollahzation” of Iraq is a primary concern for multiple external powers. 
Overall, the demise of Da’ish and rapid changes in balance of power dynamics is likely to alter the 
balance of power and future of Iraq and the Middle East.
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Balance of Power in Iraq 
Various state and non-state actors battle for influence in Iraq. Regional political dynamics in Iraq, 
Lebanon, Syria, and Yemen are largely shaped around a balance of power struggle between Sunni and 
Shi’a regimes.
120
 Figure 5 depicts the Iraqi actors and their relationships. 
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Blue arrows represent a strong positive relationship. Red checked arrows demonstrate open hostility or 
conflict while maroon dashed-dot arrows exhibit a longstanding negative relationship. These relationships 
may change quickly and are often conflict dependent. Other regional powers such as Turkey, Syria, 
Jordan, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel are carefully watching developments in Iraq to 
prevent a Da’ish resurgence, to support religious minorities within Iraq, and to ensure that other regional 
powers remain in check. 
Similarly, internal domestic politics reflect the sharp sectarian and religious divides that define 
the region. The CIA World Fact Book states that Iraq is approximately 60% Shia, 40% Sunni, and less 
than 1% of other minority religions including Christianity, Saben Mandaen, Baha’i, Zorastrian, Hindu, 
Buddhist, Yazidi, and Jewish.
121
 These religious minority groups are targets of religious persecution and 
the impetus for conflict. As previously mentioned, the Yazidis in particular were targeted by the Islamic 




The fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in 2003 represented a major blow to Saudi Arabia and other 
Sunni powers. Saudi Arabia supports Iraq’s Sunni minority, which became an entrenched insurgency after 
the Sunni dominated military and intelligence services were dismantled in 2003. The ensuing Sunni- 
Shi’a civil war amplified divisions between Sunnis and Shi’as and their proxy supporters. Iran supports 
Shi’a militia groups and the Shi’a GoI while Saudi Arabia backs a loose coalition of Sunni militias. 
Iranian and GoI backed Shi’a militias are grouped under an umbrella organization known as Hashd 
al’Shaabi or the Popular Mobilization Units (PMU). The PMU is comprised of 40 Shi’a militias, most 
prominently the Badr Organization, Saraya al-Salam, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH), Harakat Hezbollah al-
Jujaba, Saraya Taleaa al-Khorasani, and Kata’ib Imam Ali.
123
 The newly created Popular Mobilization 
Force (PMF) or Hashd al-Asha’iri is the Sunni equivalent of the PMU that was created to engage Sunni 
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communities in the fight against Da’ish.
124
 Minority groups including Turkmen, Yazidis, Shabak, and 
Christians also field small militias that protect their communities from Shi’a and Sunni encroachment. 
According to the Global Public Policy Institute, these groups assist the ISF, Peshmerga, and PMU by 
manning checkpoints, conducting security patrols, and by liaising with local communities.
125
  
The Saudis view all Iranian advances as zero sum gains, meaning any Iranian advance represents 
a threat to Saudi Arabia’s regional interests.
126
 For example, events such as the US-Iranian nuclear deal 
signed in 2015 and the growth of Iranian backed militias Hezbollah, Hamas, and the PMU in contested 
countries are all viewed by the Kingdom as a power and security loss.
127
 In Iraq, the largest Iranian 
backed militia, the Badr Organization, currently leads the Iraqi Ministry of Interior. As previously 
mentioned, Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi also demonstrated pro-Iranian leanings by refusing to 
dissolve the PMU, by making statements defending the militia’s utility, and by passing a law recognizing 
the PMU as an official political entity.
128
 
The US supports the GoI, the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG), and any other entity that is 
aiding the mission to defeat Da’ish. The US rebuilt the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) since their collapse in 
2014 and provided the Kurdish Peshmerga with training support, food, fuel, and salaries for Kurdish 
soldiers.
129
 The KRG created a dominant military fighting force and relatively stable and secure territory. 
The KRG used this newfound independence and military clout to bid for independence from the GoI, but 
Turkey and Iran will not tolerate Iraqi Kurdish independence because it may inspire Iranian and Turkish 
Kurds to revolt. The US discouraged the KRG from holding an independence referendum because the US 
wanted to avoid alienating regional allies and subverting attention from the fight against Da’ish. Overall, 
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Western forces want to finish the war in Iraq by creating a united Iraq under a stable government, by 
closing the security vacuum that allowed Da’ish to emerge in the first place, and by preventing further 
human rights abuses and carnage.  
In sum, there are many competing factions within Iraq that are backed or influenced by external 
powers. Figure 6 depicts the total manpower of each proxy, its funder, and the capability of the external 
power. According to the size and scope of each force’s manpower and external influencer, it appears that 
the US has the most influence in Iraq due to the apparent size and ability of the ISF and Kurdish 
Peshmerga. However, the continual drawdown of US military and financial support from the region and 
the questionable durability of the ISF may undercut US influence in Iraq. Instead, the enormity of the 
PMU and Iran’s defense budget make Tehran the most influential actor in Iraq followed closely by Saudi 










                                                 
130 Statistics are drawn from multiple sources to provide the most recent and up to date data on these force ratios. The ISF 
estimates are drawn from Global Fire Power. 2017. “Iraq.” Accessed December 7, 2017. Estimates on active duty members of the 
Kurdish Peshmerga and PMU were provided by GPPI cited above. Contribution estimates for the ISF were made by Morris, 
Loveday and Ryan, Missy. June 10, 2016. “After more than $1.6 billion in U.S. aid, Iraq’s army still struggles.” The Washington 
Post. PMF statistics provided courtesy of Gaston, Erica. “Sunni Tribal Forces.” All manpower estimates can be found on 
Armedforces.edu. 2016. Accessed November 21, 2017.  









168,000 US 1,301,300 554.2 billion dollars 
Kurdish 
Peshmerga 







160,000 Iran 550,000 12.3 billion dollars 
Popular 
Mobilization 







230,000 63.7 billion dollars 
Turkmen Range from 
100 to 1000 
members 
Turkey 685,862 18.2 billion dollars 
Figure 6: Military Capacity of Domestic Groups in Iraq130 
41 
 
Balance of power dynamics will not ensure influence in Iraq while the threat of insurgency and 
terrorism continue to loom over the volatile nation. This paper will now review additional schools of 
thought that will determine the potential outcomes of post Islamic State Iraq. 
Literature Review 
Multiple topics inform the long war in Iraq. These include the theoretical underpinnings of 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism studies, and previous literature articulating potential outcomes of 
post-Da’ish Iraq (discussed in the application section).  
a. Counterinsurgency 
The US War in Iraq is defined by two sub-fields of international relations and security studies: 
counterterrorism and counterinsurgency theory. First, the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) defines 
an insurgency as “…a protracted political-military struggle directed toward subverting or displacing the 
legitimacy of a constituted government or occupying power and completely or partially controlling the 
resources of a territory through the use of irregular military forces and illegal political organizations.”
131
 
The conflict in Iraq revitalized counterinsurgency (COIN) theory as it became clear to military leadership 
that they were no longer fighting a conventional conflict, but an insurgent enemy reliant on asymmetric, 
covert tactics. In 2006, the US Department of Defense released Field Manual (FM) 3-24 to contain the 
spread of al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI).
132
  
According to FM 3-24, the US military would deprive AQI of its galvanizing narrative and local 
community support by winning the “hearts and minds” of the local Iraqi population.
133
 This strategy drew 
on the works of authors such as David Galula, who asserted that an insurgency could not be defeated by 
military means alone, but through a comprehensive civil-military approach designed to win the support or 
submission of the local population.
134
 This strategy required security forces to abstain from killing 
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civilians and to address the root causes of the insurgency by providing social, economic, and 
infrastructure programs. Finally, security forces must augment their operations with local militias and 
police to identify and separate insurgents hiding among the local populace. David Kilcullen’s 
Counterinsurgency calls for a continuation of the US COIN strategy, requiring long-term military, 
political, and financial engagement from the US.
135
  
The US COIN strategy has been met with staunch opposition from veterans of the 15-year 
conflict such as Gian Gentile, who asserts that asymmetric conflicts are counterproductive and taking 
resources away from combatting greater existential threats like Russia or China.
136
 These sentiments are 
echoed across the war-weary US foreign policy and military community. Today, the US is struggling to 
transition its COIN responsibilities to the GoI. Baghdad’s struggle to implement a controlled, population-
centric strategy is complicated by political infighting and the presence of uncontrollable sectarian militias 
roaming the country and terrorizing the local population. Overall, COIN tactics will never be successful if 
the GoI cannot win the “hearts and minds” of the local population. 
b. Counterterrorism  
Da’ish is categorized as a terrorist organization because the group uses violence and intimidation 
to reach their “target audience” and to further their political cause. According to Bruce Hoffman, 
terrorism is defined as “…the deliberate creation and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of 
violence in the pursuit of political change.”
137
 Counterterrorism literature focuses on the complexities of 
defining, prosecuting, and defeating terrorist strategies. Bruce Hoffman argues that various historic 
connotations of terrorism make it a difficult concept to define.
138
 As a result, intelligence and law 
enforcement agencies have been stymied by bureaucratic constraints, privacy laws, and a slew of other 
confounding difficulties that arise when targeting a constantly evolving transnational group. According to 
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a press release by President Donald Trump’s administration, the US will continue its campaign to defeat 
Da’ish but will require coalition partners to play a greater role in the conflict.
139
 The fate of Iraq is also 
intertwined with the rise and fall of its terrorist groups and international counterterrorism efforts. 
Research Contribution & Methods 
This paper will contribute to the growing body of strategic forecasts assisting US decision makers 
to comprehend the rapidly evolving situation in Iraq. The complexity of counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism operations in Iraq requires a more flexible analytical framework that will account for the 
rapidly changing and ambiguous nature of the conflict. For this framework, this paper will look to the 
intelligence community, which was tasked with the monumental assignment of discovering, analyzing, 
understanding, and subverting the intentions of state and non-state actors.  
Intelligence analysts attempt to fill intelligence gaps, prevent intelligence failures, and make 
accurate forecasts through a variety of strategies. Schmuel Bar advocates an intelligence methodology 
that “considers six impossible things before breakfast” or that incorporates the unprecedented, unfamiliar, 
culturally foreign, or irrational notions that often bias Western intelligence analysis.
140
 Other scholars 
such as Warren Fishbein and Gregory Treverton have emphasized the importance of “alternative” 
hypotheses that should be put forth with all intelligence findings.
141
 Finally, structured analytic techniques 
summarized by Richards Heuer and Randolph Pherson are used by the US IC to develop accurate and 
flexible forecasts on rapidly evolving transnational events and actors. 
142
 
According to intelligence scholar Jack Davis, an analytical forecast is defined as, “…a judgment, 
interpretation, or prediction based on facts and findings and defended by sound and clear 
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 To develop clear argumentation, this paper will anchor its conclusions in structured 
analysis, or a series of checks that provide a solid foundation from which a predictive analysis may be 
launched. Structural analytic techniques allow analysts to overcome biases and the constraining effects of 
mental models when dealing with highly complex issues.
144
 Techniques outlined by Jack Davis include:  
I. Identifying conflict drivers or key variables. These factors are likely to drive actor 
relationships. 
II. Determining “linchpin premises” or assumptions. These assumptions should be 
constantly second guessed and tested. 
III. Articulating reasoning behind key assumptions. Analysts must be transparent with 
these conclusions and include alternative assumptions in the assessment. 
IV. Addressing alternative outcomes, and what triggers may indicate that an alternative 
scenario is playing out.
145
 
Overall, an analyst employing these techniques will challenge her own assumptions, identify 
indicators of change, and include alternative outcomes in her conclusion.
146
 This paper will employ a 
qualitative approach and explanatory research strategies to gather historic and current events, motives, 
and policies that act as potential conflict drivers in Iraq.
147
 This qualitative data will then be considered 
from a realist perspective and compiled into three potential scenarios and likely outcomes will be tested 
using structural analytical techniques. Overall, this qualitative, structural analysis of Iraq is a current 
study that can be to inform current and future decisions in Iraq.  
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Structural Analysis  
a. Key Assumptions & Conflict Drivers 
Authors attempting to execute predictive analysis today must grapple with the numerous key 
actors influencing Iraq, counterinsurgency and counterterrorism strategies, and methods of analysis to 
understand their own key assumptions and to generate accurate conflict drivers that will ground their 
predictions on the potential outcomes for Iraq.  
b. Key Assumptions  
Several key assumptions underlining the conclusions of this paper include: 
1. Da’ish will be defeated in Iraq in the immediate term. 
a. Alternative: Da’ish will go underground and re-emerge as a rebranded terrorist 
organization. 
 
2. Loss of a common enemy will exacerbate sectarian divisions and tensions between the 
Shi’a, Sunnis, and Kurds. 
a. Alternative: the Government of Iraq will be able to navigate existing tensions and reign 
in Shi’a militias 
 
3. External influences will continue to play key roles in determining the future of Iraq. 
a. Alternative: the GoI solidifies its control over the nation and becomes less reliant and 




Figure 7: Loss of Da'ish Territory, 2015-2018. 
Source: BBC, HIS Conflict Monitor. (BBC, March 2018).  
The first key assumption is that Da’ish will be defeated in Iraq. As of July 2018, 98% of the 
territory once held by Da’ish is recaptured.
148
 Further, author Thomas McCabe argues that animosity 
among various factions and the loss of credibility will make it difficult for Da’ish to go underground.
149
 In 
addition, the succession of losses suffered by the group has reduced Da’ish’s credibility and international 
recruitment base. Therefore, Da’ish’s loss of territory, the growing animosity among local communities 
towards the group, and the desecration of the group’s credibility as a global caliphate make this 
assumption highly probable.
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However, some authors such as Colin Clarke believe the fight against Da’ish is far from over and 
that the group will successfully go underground and reinvent itself as a renewed terrorist threat.
150
 The 
emergence of a new transnational terrorist group could keep Iraq mired in conflict but would also 
continue to provide rival sectarian groups with a common enemy, thus preventing the nation from falling 
into a sectarian war. External nations such as the United States, Turkey, and Iran also have a strong 
incentive to keep their proxy groups focused on combatting and defeating the Islamic State. Again, a 
common enemy prevents these groups from focusing on longstanding territorial and separatist disputes.  
The second key assumption and potential conflict driver is the imminent clash of Shi’a militias 
against Sunni communities and the Kurdish Peshmerga. Assuming the Islamic State is defeated; Iraq will 
once again be vulnerable to complex ethnic, sectarian, and religious divisions. This assumption is based 
on historic precedence in the aftermath of the US withdrawal from Iraq in 2011. The GoI failed to de-
escalate a Sunni resurgence, which resulted in escalating clashes between unruly Shi’a militias and Sunni 
communities. Clashes soon escalated into a full-blown civil war, which allowed AQI to re-enter Iraq from 
its safe haven in Syria. 
Of course, an alternative, more optimistic assumption is that the Iraqi government will broker a 
settlement between these factions. The Atlantic Council’s Task Force on the Future of Iraq expounds on 
this assumption by predicting that Iraq will emerge from the conflict as an independent, stable, and 
prosperous state with legitimate and effective governance.
 151
 Based on historic precedence and escalating 
tensions that are already occurring within Iraq, this alternative assumption seems improbable, but should 
be considered nonetheless.  
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Finally, this paper assumes that Iraq is highly vulnerable to external influences including Iran, 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. This is due to the GoI’s dependence on foreign financing 
and the existence of foreign backed militias, which is depicted in Figure 5. 
c. Conflict Drivers 
Conflict drivers in Iraq are derived from the Measuring Progress in Conflict Environments 
(MPICE) metrics framework developed by the US Institute for Peace (USIP).
152
 This framework outlines 
indicators that chart the likely outcome of a conflict. The parameters that predict a nation’s progress in a 
conflict are highly dependent on government’s ability to secure the population, practice good governance, 
ensure rule of law, bolster the nation’s economic performance, and guarantee an improvement in social 
well-being. Therefore, the main conflict drivers impeding Iraq’s progress today are: 1) A lack of security 
and 2) A lack of good governance and rule of law. 
The GoI’s failure to deliver these two requirements has derailed any chances for immediate peace 
within Iraq. First, ongoing political violence executed by rival Sunni- Shi’a militias and the inability or 
unwillingness of the GoI to demobilize these units will continue to make Iraqi citizens feel unsafe. As 
discussed in the COIN section, prevailing insecurity reduces the legitimacy of the Iraqi government and 
fuels the influence of non-state militias, external actors, and insurgent forces that seek to undermine the 
state. Citizens are also wary of the growing influence of external actors and the relative power of rival 
domestic groups. For example, the sudden acquisition of power by the Shi’as and their militias led to the 
exploitation and abuse of Sunni minority groups, which created the impetus for the sectarian civil war of 
2012. All of these factors compound the insecurity borne by Iraqi citizens and produces “cognitive gaps” 
that radicals may exploit to mobilize and radicalize civilians. 
Second, the GoI has done little to improve its legitimacy as a state run by the rule of law. 
Allegations of corruption in the government run rampant, and many politicians were accused of enriching 
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themselves. According to Transparency International’s 2016 Corruption Perception Index, Iraq is ranked 
at 166 of 176 countries surveyed, with number one being the least corrupt country.
153
 While Iraq 
improved since 2014 when Iraq ranked 170
th
, they hold a dismal 16 on Transparency International’s 
Global Corruption Barometer, where 0 is highly corrupt and 100 is perfect governance. Transparency 
International also states, “While Iraq has introduced a number of anti-corruption initiatives, these fail to 
provide a sufficiently strong integrity framework. Political interference, lack of political will, a weak civil 
society, and a lack of resources limit the effectiveness of anti-corruption measures."
154
 Endemic 
corruption will continue to undermine state security and erode civilian confidence in the government’s 
ability to secure the population. These two factors stymie other key indicators of progress such as 
improvements in the economy, civil society, and social services and increase the likelihood for conflict.  
Application 
Based on the known assumptions and key conflict drivers, there are two scenarios that are likely 
in Iraq’s immediate future. This paper will assess the probability of each based on historic and current 
conditions in Iraq. Then, this paper will ‘consider the impossible’ by assessing two alternative scenarios 
where key assumptions are proven incorrect. While alternative assumptions are unlikely, they should not 
be ignored, and analysts should reevaluate the following conclusions if a fundamental assumption is 
proven incorrect.  
a. Scenario I: Da’ish  is defeated. The Iraqi government cannot de-escalate tensions 
between Sunnis, Shi’as, and the Kurds. Iran continues to build its influence over the 
Government of Iraq, and the nation eventually succumbs to an escalation in 
sectarian conflict.  
Assuming Da’ish is defeated, it is highly likely that the Shi’a militias are going to once again 
wreak havoc in Iraq. Shi’a militias have historically committed human rights abuses and exacerbated 
tensions with religious minorities, which may result in a new round of sectarian conflicts.
 155
 Despite calls 
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from US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson for the PMU units to “go home,” Prime Minister Haider al-
Abadi stated that the PMU “defended their country and sacrificed themselves to defeat the Islamic 
State.”
156
 Al-Abadi’s defense of the PMU amid international pressure also demonstrates the GoI’s 
growing interdependence with Iran, which will exacerbate regional anxiety over Iran’s unwelcome power 
grab. In addition, clashes between PMU, PMF, and Peshmerga units have already occurred because the 
GoI holds little control over these militias. Further, the ISF continues to have issues with inadequate 
intelligence, ineffective leadership, and corruption and is no more able to stand up to radical Islamists or 
out of control militias than it was in 2014.  
From a realist perspective, external powers like Iran and Saudi Arabia have a strong incentive to 
fill the vacuum left by the withdrawal of US forces and funding. These states strive to improve their 
relative security by increasing their influence and leverage within Iraq, which may subsequently cause 
other states to enact counter measures. Overall, a lack of discipline and control over PMU and PMF units 
is going to exacerbate tensions between Sunnis and Shi’a, making another ethno-sectarian conflict highly 
likely. The chaos will create more opportunities for Iran and Saudi Arabia to increase their influence in 
this highly sought-after proxy battleground. 
b. Scenario II: Da’ish is defeated. The Iraqi government cannot de-escalate 
tensions and concedes to the demands of its most influential separatist groups. The 
Iraqi Kurds break apart.  
With key assumptions and conflict drivers in mind, the GoI could be pressured by the 
international community into accepting the separatist demands of the Iraqi Kurds in northern Iraq. But, a 
separate Kurdish state would jeopardize Iraq’s fragile peace and economic prospects as the Iraqi Kurds 
would take a large share of the Iraqi oil supply and GDP potential in the separation. The ambition of the 
Iraqi Kurds could also mobilize the separatist ambitions of Iranian and Turkish Kurds, which could have a 
destabilizing effect across the region. 
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While this scenario is possible, it is improbable due to the Iraqi Kurds lack of independent 
infrastructure and lack of external political support. Influential outside actors including Iran, Turkey, and 
the United States are highly opposed to Iraqi Kurdish secession. Iran and Turkey are against Kurdish 
autonomy because they fear a separate Kurdish state may motivate their Kurdish populations to strive for 
autonomy. Further, the aftermath of the September 25
th
 referendum vote, Baghdad’s swift actions, and the 
lack of support from the US indicates that the KRG is unlikely to become politically independent in the 
immediate future.
157
 This outcome makes sense from a realist perspective, because despite the US’ 
ideological alliance with the Kurds and their bid for independence, it makes greater strategic sense for the 
US to avoid upsetting the GoI, Turkey, and Iran until their common enemy is defeated.  
c. Alternative Scenario I: The Islamic State survives or rebrands 
If the first assumption that Da’ish will be defeated is proven false, it is likely that Iraq will remain 
united against a common enemy. The conflict against Da’ish or a similar insurgent-terrorist group will 
continue, but clashes will remain localized and Iraq will continue to benefit from the support of external 
powers bent on destroying the Islamic State. Analysts should refer to this scenario if Da’ish captures more 
territory or reinvigorates their offensive campaign in Iraq. It is also possible that Da’ish will change 
tactics. The group may evolve once again from a terrorist-insurgency hybrid to a terrorist group reliant on 
small cell operations.  
d. Alternative Scenario II: The Iraqi government affirms its national cohesion.  
If the second key assumption that sectarian and ethnic divisions will continue to plague Iraq is 
proven false, then the Iraqi government may be able to negotiate a settlement and solidify its control over 
Iraq. Under these outcomes, Iraq may be able to enjoy a period of relative stability, rebuild its economy, 
and reaffirm the nation’s influential position in the Middle East. 
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Due to the aforementioned conflict drivers, this scenario is highly improbable and may be 
impossible for the immediate future. Endemic corruption within Iraq and uneven power distributions 
reduces the likelihood that a peaceful settlement between the Shi’a, Sunnis, and the Kurds is imminent. 
Instead, real politic logic would assert that humans will continue to act in their own interest. Each faction 
will compete to increase their own power and influence, and external actors will continue to vie for a 
bigger piece of the pie.  
Conclusion 
Now that Da’ish is defeated it is imperative to look ahead and to determine likely scenarios for 
the future of Iraq. This paper evaluated likely scenarios using structural analytic techniques. These 
techniques included identifying key conflict drivers that influence actor relationships, recognizing 
“linchpin” assumptions, and challenging these assumptions by addressing alternative outcomes. These 
techniques were framed using a realist perspective to predict the likely motives and actions of non-state 
and state actors. 
Assuming the GoI continues to allow external actors to influence domestic politics, there are 
several outcomes that are likely to occur. First, it is probable that pre-existing sectarian divisions will 
once again escalate into conflict. The Iraqi government did little to resolve ethnic and sectarian tensions 
within Iraq, and these will be exacerbated once the Shi’a, Sunnis, and Kurds no longer have a common 
enemy. Conflict drivers including political, ethnic, and religious fragmentation reduced the government’s 
ability to secure the population. This lack of security caused local communities to rely on and support 
local militias, which reduced Iraq’s rule of law and eroded civilian confidence. This erosion of confidence 
contributes to the cycle of radicalization and to the longevity of radical groups like the Islamic State. 
Overall, all of these factors eliminated the immediate possibility of peace and stability for Iraq. 
Of course, there are innumerable alternative scenarios, and “black swan” or unprecedented events 
are possible. It is possible that Da’ish won’t be defeated, and the GoI could surprise the international 
community by committing to dissolve defense militias and address the concerns of the local population. 
While the future remains uncertain, it is possible for analysts to make an educated guess if they 
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understand the historic precedents, the driving actors and motivating factors, and counterterrorism and 
counterinsurgent theory. This paper attempted to hit a moving target by using a predictive analytical 
framework designed to challenge the analyst’s assumptions and imagination. Decision makers require 
more analytical pieces like this as the war in Iraq progresses, and this paper attempted to address this 
ever-expanding gap by providing a current assessment of this complex and constantly evolving conflict. 
54 
 
Chapter Three: Assessing Counterinsurgency Efforts in Post- Da’ish 
Mosul 
Abstract 
On July 9, 2017 Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared, “…the end, the collapse, and the failure of the 
false terror state of ISIS” while visiting the group’s last stronghold in Mosul.
158
 A joint effort between 
Iraq Security Forces, Shi’a and Sunni Popular Mobilization Units (PMU), and Kurdish Peshmerga Forces 
liberated the city after three years of occupation.
159
  The defeat of the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham 
(aka ISIS, ISIL, IS, Da’ish) is a laudable accomplishment. But one year later, the Government of Iraq 
(GoI) and vested external powers continue to ask, will conflict re-emerge in post-Da’ish Iraq? To answer 
this question, vested parties must determine whether COIN efforts addressed the grievances that inflamed 
Sunni radicalization in the first place.  
Introduction 
This paper continues to question the efficacy of US efforts in Iraq by exploring the likelihood of a 
Sunni violent extremist resurgence in-post Da’ish Iraq. As chapter one and two described, the US military 
outlined six Measures of Effectiveness (MOE)s to track its progress improving HNG legitimacy in Iraq. 
Indicators included improved security for the populace, legitimate elections, higher levels of political 
inclusion, culturally acceptable levels of corruption, culturally acceptable political, economic, and social 
development, and a high level of regime acceptance by major social institutions. 160  
Today, scholars and practitioners evaluating the COIN campaign in Iraq need to know; did the 
US military positively impact these indicators and improve host nation legitimacy in the long term? 
Chapter one found that security conditions improved from 2007-2011, but this paper questions whether 
this effect was sustainable after the US withdrew the bulk of its troops in 2011. This question is 
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significant because a failure to improve Sunni well-being and HNL in the long-term casts doubt on the 
sustainability of a COIN strategy. The failure of the US COIN strategy to bring sustainable peace to Iraq 
also strengthens the likelihood of post-Da’ish conflict in Iraq because the grievances that motivated the 
rise of AQI and Da’ish in the first place went unaddressed.  
This paper will use the MOE developed in chapter one to conduct a comparative analysis of 
conditions on the ground in Mosul in 2014 and 2018. Chapter two’s predictive analysis hypothesizes that 
the defeat of Da’ish may intensify ethnic and religious factions as rival groups jostle to control 
historically contested territories. Historically, unchecked attempts to consolidate power by the Shi’a 
government exacerbated Sunni marginalization and disenfranchisement, increasing the likelihood of a 
Sunni resurgence. This paper hypothesizes that improvements in Host Nation Legitimacy (HNL) and 
Sunni well-being could counteract this phenomenon and reduce the likelihood of a Sunni resurgence. This 
hypothesis will be tested by evaluating security conditions in pre and post-Da’ish Mosul. If security 
conditions in 2018 improved in comparison to 2014, a Sunni resurgence is less likely. Alternatively, if 
security conditions are the same or worse, Iraq may see another armed Sunni movement in the immediate 
future.  
Mosul Background 
Chapter one discusses the US military’s successes and setbacks while implementing a COIN 
strategy in Iraq from 2006-2011. This paper utilizes a more micro-level approach to evaluate how the US 
invasion in 2003, the US COIN strategy, and the US troop withdrawal in 2011 allowed Mosul to become 
a “strategic center of gravity” of the Sunni insurgency.
161
 Mosul is located in the second most populated 
governorate in Iraq called Ninewah (aka Ninevah) and is considered the tip of the “Sunni triangle.”
162
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Approximately 70% of the city’s 1,739,800 population is Sunni Arab, 25% is Kurdish, and the remaining 
5% is a mix of Christians, Turkmans, Shabak, and Yazidis.
163
  
The region’s ethnic diversity makes the territory a hotspot for contending political actors and 
external influencers (see chapter two for a balance of power breakdown in Iraq).
164
 Historically tense 
relations between Sunni Arabs, Shi’a Arabs, and the Kurds compounded after the overthrow of Hussein’s 
government in 2003. Politically marginalized Ba’athist Sunni Arabs lost their political positions and 
began to view the encroaching presence of Kurdish Peshmerga fighters, the looting of their homes, and 
the immediate influx of Kurds into Mosul as a threat.
165
 According to Eric Hamilton from the Institute for 
the Study of War, “In the midst of the general disorder in Mosul (after the fall of the Ba’athist party), 
former regime elements began to organize themselves into an insurgency. Demonstrators appeared in the 
streets with pro-Saddam and anti-Kurd banners and Iraqi flags calling for the withdrawal of American 
troops from Iraq.”
166
 This fledgling insurgency began a targeted bombing campaign against Shi’a civilian 
centers until the 2007 “surge” diminished the operational capacity of AQI elements in Mosul.
167
 
Nevertheless, the inability of the GoI to successfully implement COIN strategies after the departure of US 
troops in 2011 allowed residual Sunni extremists to reorganize and recruit. 
The cycle of Sunni abuse and neglect by the GoI after the departure of US forces once again 
sparked a wave of Sunni resentment; triggering protests, radicalization, and ultimately violence. Prime 
Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s sectarian policies including cutting Sunni militia pay, arresting and 
undermining Sunni leaders in parliament, and replacing Sunni and Kurdish military officers with Shi’as 
were seen as a power consolidation effort at the expense of the Sunni minority.
168
 Economically 
disenfranchised and politically marginalized Sunnis began to peacefully protest against these sectarian 
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measures starting in December 2013.
169
 Demonstrations erupted into violence in June 2014 at a protest 
camp in Hawija when GoI forces fired on a crowd of protestors, killing 40 people.
170
 Outraged Sunni 
communities became motivated by security, political, and economic concerns to support any form of 
government that challenged what they perceived as an illegitimate HNG.  
Less than a month later, the newly rebranded Da’ish began its campaign to establish an Islamic 
caliphate by taking control of capital cities, resources, and populations across northern Iraq and Syria.
171
 
As previously stated, Da’ish is an insurgency-terrorist-guerilla hybrid because the group sought to control 
and administer territories it acquired.
172
 Da’ish began to rule the territories it captured with draconian 




In Iraq, Da’ish began its territorial conquest with the seizure of Fallujah in January 2014.
174
 Large 
swaths of Anbar, Diyala, Ninewa, and Salah al-Din governorates soon followed.
175
 In June 2014 Da’ish 
took advantage of the favorable conditions for a Sunni uprising in Mosul and launched an offensive 
against Mosul in June 2014. The offensive resulted in the collapse of the ISF, allowing a comparatively 
small force of Da’ish forces to take control of Iraq’s second largest city.
176
 At its territorial peak in the fall 
of 2014, Da’ish controlled one third of Iraq’s territory, which included eight million people, 40,000 
foreign fighters, and more than 25,000 fighters from Iraq and Syria.
177
  
In March 2016, nearly two years after Da’ish took control of Iraq’s second largest city, the GoI 
announced the beginning of a joint operation to retake Mosul. The offensive included GoI security forces, 
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Shi’a Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the Kurdish Peshmerga, and Sunni militias that were 
disenchanted with Da’ish’s brutal tactics and policies.
178
 The offensive was slow and grueling, as Da’ish 
had over 10,000 fighters to man the multi-layer defenses it built over two years of occupation.
179
 The 
joint-coalition was also wary of feeding the insurgent narrative by incurring civilian casualties and needed 
to clear each building one by one.  
Mosul was liberated in July 2017 after several years of fighting.
180
 The loss of Mosul was a 
turning point for the war against Da’ish. The group proceeded to lose 98% of its territory by November 
2017 and Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi declared victory over the group the following month.
181
 Today, 
it’s clear that periods of insecurity and unrest in Iraq are correlated with a lack of security, HNG 
legitimacy, and political and economic exclusion of Iraq’s Sunni minority. If these issues are not 
adequately addressed, it is likely that disenfranchised Sunnis will once again join extremist groups like 
AQI and Da’ish. It is therefore imperative for policymakers, leaders, and scholars to understand whether 
security conditions have improved for the Sunni population, because if they have not, Iraq is doomed to 
repeat its past mistakes. 
Literature Review 
As stated in chapters one and two, contemporary studies of the War in Iraq are largely informed 
by international relations, COIN, and counterterrorism theory. Researchers forecasting Iraq’s future must 
apply the tenants learned from COIN and counterterrorism literature to postulate whether the Islamic 
State or a similar insurgency will reemerge in Iraq. Practitioners working to bring sustainable peace to 
Iraq are also integrating these theories into their reconstruction plans and policies. By integrating the 
lessons learned from US COIN exploits and failures in Iraq, academics, practitioners, and other interested 
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parties gain a better understanding of Iraq’s future. Thus enabling them to develop a more comprehensive 
plan to steer the country towards long-term stability. Section a. builds on the literature review of chapters 
one and two by briefly summarizing COIN theory. Section b. focuses on COIN efforts in Iraq and the 
leading debates over the strategy’s effectiveness. Section c. assesses the various methods used by scholars 
and practitioners to forecast the potential for conflict or a Sunni resurgence in Iraq’s. 
a. Coin Review  
Chapter one and two explain that an insurgency or irregular warfare relies on the support of the 
people to survive.
 
The US military’s Field Manual 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5 (FM 3-24) defines irregular 
warfare as a “…violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the 
relevant population(s).”
182
 As previously mentioned, political legitimacy is also an integral concept in the 
Central Intelligence Agency’s definition of an insurgency or a “protracted military struggle directed 
toward subverting or displacing the legitimacy of a constituted government or occupying power and 
completely or partially controlling the resources of a territory through the use of irregular military forces 
and illegal political organizations.”
 183
 The HNG and insurgent forces battle for political legitimacy 
because an insurgency cannot survive without the HNP’s support. As Robert Taber states in his study on 
guerilla warfare, the HNP “…is his camouflage, his quartermaster, his recruiting office, his 
communications network, and his efficient, all-seeing intelligence service.”
184
  Therefore, the insurgent 
does everything he can to undermine the HNG’s authority, so he can control the “hearts and minds” of the 
HNP. If the insurgent can successfully diminish the people’s confidence in the state’s ability to protect 
and provide for them, they can bolster their recruitment rates and debilitate the ruling government’s 
ability and will to fight.  
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The counterinsurgent foils the insurgent’s strategy by implementing a civil-military approach that 
isolates and eliminates insurgent fighters while improving host nation legitimacy. Chapter one and two 
discuss the population-centric strategies developed by French military strategists Roger Trinquier and 
David Galula and what Kennedy and Pile define as the “institutional learning” ability of the British to 
adapt during COIN campaigns.
185
 These lessons formed the theoretical underpinnings used by modern 
COIN proponents to lobby for a COIN strategy in Iraq to combat the rise of AQI in 2003-2004 and Da’ish 
in 2014. 
FM 3-24 asserts, “Defeating an insurgency requires a blend of both civilian and military efforts 
that address both assisting the host-nation government in defeating the insurgents on the battlefield and 
enabling the host nation in addressing the root causes of the insurgency.”
186
 Counterinsurgents must 
address the grievances that fuel the insurgent cause and build the people’s confidence in the HNG’s 
ability to provide security and basic services. However, the manual goes on to say that a 
counterinsurgency “…cannot compensate for lack of will, acceptance of corruption, or counterproductive 
behavior on the part of the supported government or population.”
187
 This warning foreshadows the 
inherent difficulties of implementing a civil-military strategy to assist a government that already 
demonstrated its inability or unwillingness to meet the HNP’s needs. 
b. COIN in Iraq 
As previously stated in chapters one and two, COIN proponents like Maj. General David H. 
Petraeus urged the military to shift strategies when it became clear that the US was fighting a Sunni 
insurgency bent on establishing an Islamic caliphate.
188
 A 2004 merge between Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s 
Jama’at al-Tawhid w’al-Jihad with Osama bin Laden’s al-Qa’ida  al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) transformed the 
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In a letter to al-Qa’ida in 2001 requesting to merge forces, Zarqawi urged al-Qa’ida to wage war 
against the Americans, Kurds, and Shi’a by attacking Shi’a strongholds to, “…provoke them to show the 
Sunnis their rabies and bare the teeth of the hidden rancor working in their breasts.” He went on, “If we 
succeed in dragging them into the arena of sectarian war, it will become impossible to awaken the 
inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent danger and annihilating death at the hands of these Sabeans.”
190
  
Zarqawi’s letter hints at the group’s global ambitions and calls for the use of an ancient insurgent tactic: 
insurgent forces will provoke the Shi’a by attacking holy Shi’a sites. Retribution attacks by Shi’a forces 
against Sunni communities will cause threatened Sunni’s to join AQI for protection, forcing the US to 
intervene as the sectarian conflict escalates. Zarqawi believed this conflict would motivate the Muslim 
world to join the violent movement and help defeat Shi’a/Kurdish/Zionist/Western elements throughout 
the region.  
The US military developed and implemented a COIN strategy in the form of FM 3-24 in in 2006 
to combat Zarqawi’s strategy.
 191
 FM 3-24 encouraged the GoI and Shi’a militias to exercise restraint and 
limit civilian casualties, to separate insurgents from the HNP, and emphasized the importance of a robust 
civil-military program.
192
 As previously mentioned, the combined effect of the “Anbar Awakening” and 
the assistance of the US backed Sunni militias like the Sons of Iraq in identifying and eliminating AQI 
cells combined with the 2007 “surge” helped reduce civilian casualty rates.
193
 These military actions were 
supplemented by the implementation of infrastructure programs and the announcement of a power-
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sharing agreement in November 2010.
 194
 The culmination of these events reduced AQI’s operational 
capacity, undermined the group’s narrative, and briefly stabilized the security environment in Iraq. 
However, critics of COIN theory assert that this success was short-lived and did not really alter the course 
of the war. As Ryan Evans comments in a Foreign Policy article, the International Security Assistance 
Force, “…has been unable to translate operational progress into strategic success.”
195
  
Criticisms of the COIN strategy multiplied when the Iraq government collapsed into sectarian 
war after the US began its troop drawdown in 2011. War weariness and mounting frustration spurred a 
debate between mavericks and conservatives like Col. Gian Gentile over whether COIN is effective, or 
even possible, in today’s political climate.
196
 Conservatives like Gentile or Joshua Rovner at the US Naval 
War College challenge the assumption that General Petraeus and his COIN strategy altered the course of 
the Iraq and Afghanistan wars. Instead, these practitioners criticize the leading narrative perpetuated by 
authors such as David Kilcullen or Mark Moyar’s leadership centric COIN model.
197
 According to 
conservatives, these authors incorrectly portray Petraeus as a “maverick” or “hero” general that turned the 
tide of the Iraq war by implementing a COIN strategy.
198
  
The maverick-conservative debate evolved in the military and foreign policy community into a 
debate over military expenditures to counter asymmetric threats like AQI. These debates arose at a critical 
juncture for US COIN in Iraq, because the return of AQI as Da’ish once again necessitated the need for a 
COIN strategy. As Richard Barrett states,” “The rapid expansion of the Islamic State on both sides of the 
Iraq/Syria border after 2011 pushed it (the group) along the continuum from terrorism to insurgency. Its 
underground cells became military divisions and its hit-and-run tactics became campaigns to conquer and 
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 Despite the clear nature of the insurgent threat posed by the Islamic State, military and 
foreign policy practitioners are becoming more averse to committing US troops to a COIN strategy and to 
what some derisively call a “nation building campaign.”  
c. Forecasting Scenarios in Iraq  
Researchers evaluating COIN outcomes use their findings to explain current conditions in Iraq, 
predict likely scenarios, and offer policy prescriptions for decision makers. Seth Jones advocates for the 
US to continue expanding its population centric COIN approach in Rolling Back the Islamic State.
200
 
According to Jones, the US has four possible strategies it can employ to ensure Da’ish never returns. The 
US can completely disengage from Iraq,  keep enough troops in country to contain the threat, conduct a 
“light” rollback by relying on airpower, special operations forces, intelligence forces, and local partners to 
continue the US COIN strategy, or leave more ground troops to continue a “heavy” rollback.
201
 Jones 
argues for a “light” rollback strategy that emphasizes addressing the grievances of minority groups. This 
strategy would also require troops to continue working with the GoI to provide security for the HNP 
while building local governing capacity and conducting an ideological campaign to counter Da’ish’s 
narrative. 
More broadly, scholar T.X. Hammes asserts there are several approaches advocated by the 
foreign policy community when it comes to preparing the US military for future asymmetric conflicts. 
Counterinsurgents believe the US should prepare for future irregular wars because they are the most 
likely to occur. Traditionalists believe the US should reserve its energy and resources to counter 
conventional threats.
202
 In-between these camps are utility infielders and the division of labor proponents, 
who believe resources should be balanced between asymmetric and conventional threats and that the US 
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should rely more on agile, flexible Special Forces units to achieve military objectives.
203
 As Hammes 
suggests, the US cannot move forward with its military priorities until it understands what worked and 
what didn’t work in the past. It is therefore essential for policymakers to have a clear framework for to 
determine whether counterinsurgents met their objectives in Iraq. 
Some analysts speculate another Sunni-Shi’a conflict is inevitable unless the US and Iraq 
government prioritize reconstruction efforts. The Humanitarian Foresight Think Tank used structural 
analytical techniques to identify three potential 2018 scenarios for post-IS Iraq. The report predicts that 
intra and inter-factional conflicts between the primarily Shi’a Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), Sunni, 
and Kurdish factions will increase if Sunni minority communities remain politically and economically 
disenfranchised.
204
 According to the think tank, “A lack of trust in the state, the proliferation of weapons 
and internal and external forces vying for dominance, and grievances both historical and inchoate will 
ultimately lead factions in the Iraq landscape...to take things into their own hands.”
205
  
All of these studies and arguments demonstrate the divisive nature of the COIN debate and the 
uncertainty that surrounds policymaking for Iraq’s future. This debate is also significant for military 
practitioners guiding the allocation of resources and training time in the future. Without knowing the true 
outcome of the Iraq COIN campaign, it is difficult to argue the strategy should be implemented again by a 
struggling GoI or by the US military in future theaters. This paper addresses this research gap by 
evaluating a snap shot in time of 2014 and 2018 Mosul. These time periods were critical for the rise and 
fall of Da’ish, and can help researchers determine whether history is likely to repeat itself in this volatile 
region.  
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This paper will use a positivist, mixed-methods approach to conduct a comparative case study of 
security conditions in pre and post- Da’ish Iraq. As David McNabb explains in Research Methods for 
Political Science, positivists use quantitative data to produce and test cause-and-effect predictive theories.
 
206
 This research approach was chosen because it emphasizes objectivity and draws on quantitative data to 
understand a complex, often highly charged phenomena. However, chapter one explained that qualitative 
data alone does not provide enough context to understand the complexities of the Iraq War. Therefore, 
this study will employ John Creswell’s concurrent embedded design to strengthen its positivist 
approach.
207
 See Figure 1 in chapter one for a diagram of a concurrent embedded design. Quantitative 
data will be prioritized, but also supported by embedded qualitative interviews of Iraqi citizens. 
Interviews from Amnesty International provide a richer picture of why and how groups like AQI and 
Da’ish garnered support in Sunni dominated areas. More importantly, individual testimonies provide 
greater insight into whether violent extremist groups are likely to re-emerge. 
a. Alternative Methods 
A purely quantitative and a purely qualitative explanatory approach were considered but not 
chosen for several reasons. First, security statistics do not fully capture the terror and insecurity that is felt 
by Sunni civilians on a daily basis. These civilians do not just live in fear or Da’ish, but remember the 
past atrocities committed by government sponsored militias. Understanding these sentiments allows 
researchers to gain a better understanding of why Sunni communities would support an extremist uprising 
against the Shi’a government.  
A purely qualitative approach was also considered for evaluating Sunni well-being. However, it 
takes time to conduct interviews, surveys, and other forms of qualitative data collection. Qualitative data 
on such a recent issue is difficult to acquire in such a short time period. Qualitative data also needs to be 
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bolstered by qualitative statistics to comprehend trends affecting all of Iraq. Nevertheless, future studies 
on post- Da’ish Iraq would benefit from the integration of more qualitative data when available. This 
paper will combine both approaches to overcome the limits of quantitative and qualitative data and create 
a clearer picture of pre and post- Da’ish Mosul. But this positivist, mixed method also comes with several 
potential pitfalls that were briefly mentioned in chapter one.  
b. Challenges 
There are multiple challenges associated with conducting an analysis on an ongoing conflict in a 
politically charged arena dominated by military and clandestine actors. First, there is no official estimate 
for civilian casualties in Iraq and the data that is available may be biased or unreliable. Lionel Beehner 
points out in “The Difficulties of Counting Iraq’s War Dead” that challenges including inadequate census 
data, poor security, and the US’s inability to put forward an accurate body count make it difficult for 
researchers to determine accurate death tolls.
208
 Samuel Oakford from the Atlantic demonstrates this point 
by comparing Associated Press findings to Iraqi city morgue estimates collected by an NPR investigation. 
While Iraq city morgue estimates during the recapture of Mosul were as low as 5,000 killed, AP estimated 
that over 10,000 civilians died from October 2016 to July 2017.
209
 
This paper overcomes data challenges in Iraq by aggregating estimates from several reliable, non-
biased sources. All sources may have an inherent bias or agenda, but this paper specifically chose not to 
use Department of Defense and the GoI data due to the politically charged nature of the war and the 
appeal to underreport civilian statistics. Instead, this paper aggregates data from the Iraq Body Count 
(IBC) and from the United Nations Assistance Mission for Iraq (UNAMI). These sources are typically 
considered independent and are generally used by other researchers to determine casualty rates in Iraq.
210
 
Second, data collection in current and former conflict zones is dangerous. It is impossible for 
most researchers to journey to Mosul to collect qualitative interviews or statistics without putting others 
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in danger. Post-conflict zone dangers automatically exclude data collection methods such as surveys and 
interviews. This paper overcomes this challenge by using interviews collected by non-governmental 
organizations and by using quantitative statistics.  
Third, it takes time to analyze raw data, so analysis on more recent events that took place from 
2017-2018 will be limited. This paper limits its measurements to open source, available casualty data.  
Finally, there are a myriad of potential indicators that are used by researchers to assess 
reconstruction progress and security conditions in Iraq. For example, a Brookings Institution report by 
Michael O’Hanlon and Jason Campbell uses almost 50 indicators for security alone.
211
 The limited scope 
and resources of this paper requires indicators to be limited.  
This paper will therefore limit its investigation to security conditions which will be measured by 
one major indicator: civilian casualties. Future studies should integrate additional economic and political 
data, such as political opinion polls and the nationwide unemployment rate to gain a broader 
understanding of other means of reconstruction progress.  
c. Chosen Indicator & Case Study 
Security was once again chosen as an indicator because reconstruction efforts cannot take place in 
the absence of security. This metric is therefore one of the most important measurements for an effective 
reconstruction strategy and will be a good predictor for Iraq’s future. This indicator also has more 
tangible results in a shorter period of time than other indicators such as political inclusivity or government 
acceptance by major institutions. Mosul was selected to be studied because it is a significant city for Iraq 
and Da’ish. Mosul represented a major asset for Da’ish as it is the second largest city in Iraq with 
abundant resources and a strategic placement in the country’s Sunni heartland. 
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This paper will test the null hypothesis that a Sunni resurgence in post- Da’ish Iraq is unlikely 
because security conditions improved for Sunni communities. This paper will compare aggregated IBC 
and UNAMI statistics from both time periods to determine whether security conditions in Mosul 
improved from 2014 to 2018. If civilian casualty rates significantly decreased post- Da’ish, this paper will 
assume that the null hypothesis listed below is correct. Similar or higher casualty rates in 2017-2018 will 




H0: Post-Da’ish security conditions for Sunnis are better than pre-Da’ish Mosul. A Sunni 
resurgence is less likely. 
 
 
Ha: Post-Da’ish security conditions in Sunni communities are the same or worse in post-Da’ish 
Mosul. A Sunni resurgence is more likely. 
 
Qualitative data will be used to derive information about the security environment that cannot be 
captured by qualitative data alone. This information cannot discredit or disprove either hypothesis but can 
call into question the universality of quantitative data if the quantitative and qualitative data result in 
different conclusions. 
Pre-Da’ish Security Conditions in Mosul  
a. Quantitative Data, Civilian Casualty Rates–2014  
Figure 7 displays data taken from the Iraq Body Count (IBC) and the United Nations Assistance 
Mission to Iraq (UNAMI). Iraq Body Count (IBC) is an independent British organization that tracks all 
civilian casualties involving any type of weapons where one person or more was killed. The IBC 
estimated that 29,101 people were killed from January 2014 to June 2015, making this the most violent 
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period of the war since violence peaked during the 2007 surge.
213
  The United Nations figures correlated 
with IBC figures, but were generally lower. According to UNAMI, 16,277 civilians were killed from 
January 2014 to June 2015. This lower figure may reflect the UN’s more rigorous vetting system of 
casualty events. UNAMI includes a caveat at the bottom of its page reminding researchers that UNAMI 
does not include unverified casualties. This may lead to underreporting in certain areas. Accurate 




According to both databases, 500–1,000 Iraqi civilians were killed every month prior to Da’ish’s 
advance into Mosul. This finding demonstrates that violence levels were high before Da’ish’s takeover 
and that the HNG or GoI was failing to provide security for its civilians. Violence levels began to climb in 
May, just one month before ISIS took control of the city. Civilian casualties peaked several more times 
throughout 2014 and remained high over the next year, implying that security conditions for local Sunni 
communities were poor from 2014 to 2015. 
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Civilian Casualties by Month, Jan 2014 - Jun 2015 
IBC UNAMI
 
The conclusion that security conditions were poor in Mosul leading up to Da’ish’ takeover is 
unsurprising. Many Sunnis welcomed Da’ish at first because they desperately needed security and 
governance.  
a. Qualitative Data – 2014  
Several polls were assessed to determine Iraqi Sunni Arab opinions towards security in pre- 
Da’ish Ninewah. Craig Charney from the International Peace Institute found that opinion polls from an 
Iraqi research firm known as IACSS and a Gallup poll indicated that Sunnis were concerned for their 
security in the months leading up to the emergence of Da’ish.
 215
 According to Charney, the IACSS 
determined that 25% of people in Ninewah reported having a family member suffer from a crime in the 
past year, while only 1% of respondents from Shi’a dominated parts of Iraq such as Basra affirmed that a 
family member was affected by crime.
216
 Another IACSS poll of 120 people in Mosul conducted in 
February 2014 found that 100% of the respondents said they did not want to be liberated by Shi’a or 
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Kurdish militias. This finding indicates that respondents believed Shi’a or Kurdish militias would be 
worse than Da’ish governance.
217
   
Similarly, Charney cited a 2013 Gallup Poll of 1,000 interviews of Iraq adults, indicating that 
Sunnis were more likely to see the country as worse off after the US withdrawal of its forces in 2011.
218
 
On average, Sunni respondents believed corruption, jobs and unemployment, security, and political 
stability were worse than Shi’a respondents, and Sunnis reported much higher rates of security 
deterioration, police or military interference in their private lives, and political alienation. 
219
  
This sampling of polls from an Iraqi polling firm and the globally recognized Gallup Poll 
organization used different methods to draw similar conclusions: Sunni communities felt less secure from 
2013 to 2014 than their Shi’a counterparts. These findings indicate a predictable trend that Sunnis would 
support any organization or movement that could provide the security and stability that the GoI was 
denying. Qualitative surveys therefore indicate that Sunni community’s acceptance of Da’ish was largely 
motivated by security concerns and fear of being ruled by Shi’a or Kurdish militias. These findings also 
insinuate that US COIN efforts failed to provide sustainable security conditions that would extend to 
2014. This paper will now compare these results to post-Da’ish security conditions for Sunnis. 
Post-Da’ish Security Conditions in Mosul   
a. Quantitative Data, Civilian Casualty Rates -- 2018 
Figure 9 includes data from IBC and UNAMI for 2017-2018. After the fall of Da’ish in July 
2017, civilian casualties significantly decrease for the next four months. As the security environment 
stabilized in August 2017 we see a return to a little under 500 civilian deaths per month in Mosul. These 
figures are lower than pre-Da’ish rates and indicate an improvement in the security environment in the 
short-term.  
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Figure 9: Civilian Casualty Rates, 2017-2018 
 
Further, an analysis of Figure 10’s civilian casualty rate trends from 2013-2018 indicates that the 
linear trend for both databases is decreasing, implying that security conditions improved in Mosul since 
the withdrawal of US troops from Iraq in 2011. These quantitative findings indicate that an insurgency is 
less likely to emerge in post Da’ish Mosul because security conditions temporarily improved. While these 
trends are unsurprising, they are significant for practitioners seeking to understand the threat environment 
and future trends in Iraq. If the GoI continues to stabilize security conditions in Mosul, it will diminish 
the potential for a Sunni resurgence in that area. However, if the GoI does not force Shi’a and Kurdish 
security forces to practice measured restraint towards Sunni communities, it is more likely a violent 
extremist movement will re-emerge. This paper will now compare these findings to qualitative data 
collected in post-Da’ish Mosul. 
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a. Qualitative Data – 2018 
An analysis of a 2018 Amnesty International report revealed serious security concerns held by 
Arab Sunnis in Ninewah. Despite civilian casualty rates decreasing in 2018, interviews of Sunni survivors 
indicate that other security concerns including retribution attacks and discrimination against Sunni 
communities continue to threaten Sunni civilians on a daily basis. 
Between October 2017 and March 2018 three Amnesty International researchers interviewed 92 
women, 11 camp administrators, 24 staff members of international Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs), six staff members from national NGOs, and nine current or former UN officials in Ninewah and 
Salah al-Din.
220
 Researchers found that thousands of Sunni “Da’ish family” members or people belonging 
to a tribe that supported Da’ish are being subjected to collective punishment in the form of arbitrary 
arrests, detentions, discrimination, sexual harassment and assault, restrictions on their freedom of 
movement, and in some cases, retribution attacks and the burning or destroying of their homes.
221
 A 20 
year old Mosul woman interviewed by Amnesty International confided, “Because they consider me the 
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same as an IS fighter, they (Shi’a militias) will rape me and return me back. They want to show everyone 
what they can do to me.”
222
 These stories underscore the serious security threats posed towards Sunni 
survivors in post- Da’ish areas that are being ignored or purposefully conducted by GoI security forces. 
The Amnesty International report also identifies “enforced disappearances” of thousands of men 
and boys by Shi’a and Kurdish militias as a serious security concern for Sunni communities. These Sunni 
men and boys were arrested, detained, tortured, extra judicially executed, or “disappeared.”
223
 Family 
members struggle to survive without the assistance of these men and boys and fear retribution attacks or 
new “disappearances” of remaining family members. 
Assessing Reconstruction Efforts in the Future 
The Baghdad government will be challenged to meet the needs of its constituents in the 
immediate future. In 2018 the GoI requested $88 billion dollars for reconstruction needs across the 
country. According to the US Congressional Research Service, the GoI received just $30 billion in 
“…loans, investment pledges, export credit arrangements, and grants in response.”
224
 According to a 2018 
report released by the Congressional Research Service, an estimated 2.3 million Iraqis remain internally 
displaced.
225
 President Trump’s administration pledged to continue funding Iraq stabilization efforts and 




This chapter continued to explore this paper’s overarching question: did the US military meet its 
COIN objectives in Iraq? This question is significant for reconstruction efforts in Iraq and the future 
direction of US military priorities. Positive reinforcement of the COIN campaign may encourage US 
policymakers to continue investing in reconstruction efforts in Iraq. In contrast, if conservatives or critics 
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of the “hero” COIN narrative gain a broader following, the US may reprioritize the bulk of its military 
funding towards preparing for conventional threats like Russia and China.  
This chapter expanded on the research of chapters one and two by conducting a positivist, mixed 
methods case study on pre and post-Da’ish Mosul. The US military concluded that a doctrinal shift was 
necessary to combat the rise of the AQI insurgency that emerged in the aftermath of the US invasion of 
Iraq in 2003. COIN advocates developed and implemented FM 3-24 to address this doctrinal gap. The 
field manual called for a population-centric COIN strategy that would isolate and eliminate the 
insurgents, reduce civilian casualties, and bolster HNL. Chapter one demonstrated that this strategy could 
successfully improve security conditions in the short-term. But the withdrawal of US forces cut the COIN 
strategy short. The inability of the GoI to execute its handover responsibilities gave Islamic extremists the 
opportunity to reemerge as Da’ish.  
Mosul was chosen as a case study because it is a historic Sunni stronghold and served as a center 
of gravity for AQI and later Da’ish insurgents. An analysis of aggregated IBC and UNAMI civilian 
casualties confirmed the null hypothesis that security conditions improved in Mosul from 2014 to 2018. 
This confirmation indicates that a Sunni resurgence is less likely if other MOE indicators are also 
positive. However, a closer look at qualitative interviews of “Da’ish families” reveals that these civilians 
continue to be harassed, detained, tortured, and “disappeared” on a daily basis. In this case, the addition of 
qualitative data altered the narrative of the MOE. Yes, Sunnis are getting killed less frequently in 2018, 
but that does not mean they feel secure. This finding is significant because feelings of insecurity are a 
motivating grievance that can give rise to an insurgency. If these grievances are not remedied by 
reconstruction efforts, it is highly likely that a Sunni resurgence will occur. 
In conclusion, this chapter found that the Iraq COIN campaign did improve security conditions in 
Iraq in the short-term. Security conditions in Mosul were also significantly better after the defeat of 
Da’ish in 2017. However, reductions in civilian casualties do not provide a holistic picture of the security 
environment in Mosul. Qualitative data, such as surveys and interviews, are required to understand 
whether Sunni well-being improved in post-conflict zones in Iraq. These findings highlight the 
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importance of using mixed-methods research designs to develop MOEs for evaluating complex 
phenomenon like COIN outcomes. Finally, further research should be conducted to identify and propose 





This paper explored one of the most contentious wars and policies questions of our time and 
asked, was the US COIN campaign successful in Iraq? Chapter one developed an MOE for evaluating 
whether the US Coalition positively impacted security conditions for the HNP. Chapter two explored 
what future scenarios were likely in Iraq after the demise of Da’ish. Finally, this paper tested whether 
security conditions improved for the Sunni population in Mosul from 2014 to 2018. A mixed methods 
research approach provided a more holistic picture of the outcomes of the COIN campaign in Iraq. 
Quantitative data supported the null hypothesis that security conditions improved after the fall of Da’ish 
in Iraq. However, qualitative data highlighted ongoing concerns of the Sunni population. This finding 
demonstrates that despite our best efforts, the Sunni population remains vulnerable for radicalization. 
Overall, this study of past, present, and future outcomes of the US COIN policy in Iraq 
demonstrates that the strategy can make a positive impact in the short term. However, security gains are 
limited without long-term political support both internationally and domestically. But, without the 
implementation of a COIN strategy, history is likely to repeat itself. History demonstrates the GoI’s 
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